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CP.APTER I 
INTRODUCTIOH 
The alM of this thesis is to work out a complete explanation of the 
habitual. knowledge which St. Thomas sqs the human soul has of itself. We 
wish to explain the following statement of st. 'fh0ll18.8: 
Bed quantum ad cop! tioDem bahi tualem, sic dico quod an:1ma per 
e.seat1Bll auam se videt" 14 est ex ht>c ipso quod essentia sua 
est sibi praesens, est potens exira :i.n actum cogn1 tionia su1 
ipsiusJ aint aliquis ex hoc quod habet alicu1ua seientiae 
habitua, ex ipsa praesentia habitus, est potens pereipere i1la 
quae subsunt ill1 habitui. Ad hoc autem quod percipiat anima 
.e ease, at quid in seipsa. agatur attendat, non requiritur 
aliqu1e habitus; sed ad. hoe suttie!t sola ea_ntia animae 
quae meati eat praesens J ex sa enim actus progrediuntur, in 
quibua aotuall tel' ip.a percipi tur.1 
The text .... have chosen appears as the second part of a four-part. antnIer 
to the question whether the soul. knows iteelt by meana of its own essence or 
by meana of 80JIle speci... The main d5.:Y1aion of the response is two-folds 1) 
concerning knowledge of the soul as existing in a particular individual. and 
2) concerning knowledge of the soul leading to understanding of the nature of 
the soul. !he first type of s.U-knowleclge 8l1IJW9rs the question an est? and 
--
the second the question Suid .!.!l'1 regarding the human soul. 
In. Ver., 10, 8 e. 
--
1 
2 
The knowledge the lJOul has of it sell" as an existing singular takes place 
at two levelsl actual knowledge and habitual knowledge. The knowledge ot 1 t. 
nature also invo1'fts two 18'1818. that of apprehension, 1n which the 
scientific notion ot the soul is elaborated} and that of judgment, in wh1ch 
the soul comes to cantina the content of apprehension as the true nature of 
the soul. 
Therefore, four distinct answers are gi ftn to the question whether tba 
soul knowa 1 tselt through 1 ts e •• nee or through some species I 
A. Knowledge of the indi~dual soul - an eat? 
--
1.. Actual knovledge - through the operations of the soul. 
2. Habitual. lmowleclge - through the essence at the soul. 
B. Knowledge of the nature of the soul -- ~!!l? 
1. In apprehension - through the species. 
2. In judgment - through unchangeable truth, impressed. on the soul. 
From the 'HOrde at st. Thomas, 1t is clear that habitual aelJ."....Jmowled.ge 
is a condition underly'ing the actual knowledge the soul has at its existence 
2 
1n ita operations. Ynus ~ text we will center our attention on describes 
the peculiar aspect at the constitution at man which is the underl3'ing cause 
at the e.xperienoe at sel.t-lmowledge in the soul. 
Th. idea behind the choice at this particular text 1s that the ~ at 
211anfma per essentiam suam .. v1det, 1d est ex hoc ipso quod esaentia sua 
est sibi praesens, .st potens exire in oognitionem troi ipsiua." Ibid. 
-
3 
the response and the answers to the opinions in thie article of the 
De Veritate comprise the most systematic elaboration of st. Thomas' thought on 
-
the knower's knowledge of h:imselt.3 Our purpose is to throw more light on 
this whole area of 'i'heaistic pqchology" by a thorough stud.v or the secoJld ~ 
the tour parts ot the response. 
The method of our study will be genetic. We will first exudne the texta 
in the Oommenta?: .2!! ~ Sentence. which pertain to our topic. This will be 
the work of Chapter II. Next, .. will study the treatment ot selt-knowledge 
in God and in the angels aa founc1 in the E! .... Ve....,ri ....... ta_te ... in passages prior to our 
text. In the .. explanations we W1l1 try to uncover the general principles 
which govern the aolution gi'f8n in our central text. This is the work ot 
Chapter m. In Chapter IV we will make a caretul stud;y of this centrral 
passage, examining the exact wording and giving special empbuis to the 
comparison of the human soul With an intellectual habit. Finall.y, in Chapter 
V, 118 will aurvey the later statements of st. Thomas which contr1bute to our 
understanding of the soulls habitual self-know1edge as described in the 
!!. Veritate. Our objecti ... ~en is to reach a full understanding of the 
.3rurthemore, this article is the one place where st. Thomas explains 
habitual selt-knowledge. In the Commen~ on the Sentences re:f'lective 
knowledge is treated in various passage8Utn.ver 1dth the cOl'Opl.etenes8 of 
De Veritate, 10, 8. De Ventate, 1, 9, develops a special type of re.t1eotion 
round in me movementrrom apprehension to judgment. In the Contra Gentiles, 
m, 46, the topic comes up in the course of the long argument concernirii tEe 
end ot man. The distinction ot the soul'. knowledge of its existence from 
knowledge of its nature is made, but the topic 18 not developed further. In 
the Summa !heOlosaae, I, 87, 1, St. Tbomas compares Divine, angelic, and hUllan 
sel.ttO«nowlecrg;;.n human selt-knowledge, the treatment is an abrid&ment of 
De Ventate, 10, 6, without mention of habitual seU-knDvledge. :r:n the au-a, 
1; 9:J, 1 a:a L, habitual self-knovledge is mentioned but without explanatIon. 
Each of these texts will be examined in Chapter V. 
4 
habitual knowledge the soul has of itself, with special attention to the 
pertinent statements made by St. 'lbomaa before the composition of the eighth 
,.article ot the tenth question of the De Verita:te. 
-_ ................ 
To complste this lntrocluctory chapter we v1ll examine briet'.q the previ-
oua work ot 1'homietic scholars on the text .. have chosen. We v:1l1 proceed by 
desCribing the contribution of four different writers to the elucidation of 
the doctrine. 
Fr. Ambroise Gardeil .. O.P., took up our text in the proces. of presenting 
a theological explanation of grace and lI\18tical experience. 4 His main idea 
was that the babi tual and actual kmwledge the soul has ot i tselt gi'ftS an 
exact pattern to tollow in explaining the inhabitation of God in the just soul 
and the consequent knowledge of God in Jr{1Stiea.l experience.' 'lbus an expla-
nation ot the soul's habitual knowladge of itself' was an important step in 
the first stages of the _rIc Fr. Gerdeil Ulldertook. 
Again and again, Fr. GardeU insisted that habitual self-knowledge was 
~. Gardeil t S main lrIOrk in this area is La structure de 1 t ~ et 
1 t!!1.'!rience ~ti9'! (Paris, 1921), 2 vole. He presenQ iii earner stu~ ot 
'the matter pe ining to this thesis in ItLa perception experimentale de l' sma 
par e1le-meme d t apres saint Thoms.a," Mllan,.8 Thomiste8 (Kain, 1923).. pp. 
219-2.36. 
A >rr. Gardeil 8\l1I1ma.r1zed. his intention: "La connaiaaanee hab1tuelle de 
1 t au par so1 et la conscience actuelle de soi qui actualise cette conscience 
habituelJ.e ne sont pas aeulemeRt una analog~, une ex.wnJ9.e, une modele de 
ltinhabitation de Dieu dans ltmn.e Jl8l" 1& grace de l'experience m;ystique. Je 
rega.rde la st1"ucture interne de 1 t ime et de la conscience psychologique comme 
ut:lI8 raison explicative/a radice de la structure de l'habitation de D1eu dan8 
18 juate, et de l'experience mystique. C'est d'ailleurs a priori inevitable 
en wrtue du principle que' ee que est ~u ., confo:rme au-lOOClEl a'~ye de SOD 
sujet recepteur. t Tout mon ouvrage 'tend ~ et&blir cette oonftmmite 
structurale.ft In ftQuestion de nomenclature ell matiere de contemplation," 
Rew.e Thomiste, XIV (July, 1931), 727. 
the particular disposition or the soul which made experimental selt-awareness 
possible. Once the intellect i8 in operation, the habitual disposition passes 
into actual perception of the soul with the result that the knower can aftirm 
6 
wi th certitude, ft It is I who thinks and knows. It 
-
'!he intention in Fr. GardeU's diSOUS8ion or our De Veritate text is to _ ........................... 
allow that this particular Vpe ot knoW'l.ed.ge reaches the existing, concrete 
substance or the soul. thus it is an experimental knowledge ot the 80ul which 
proceeds trom the habitus ot selt-knowl.edp. 
The part ot Fr. Garde1l's work which is relevant to us is the a:r;planation 
he dew loped or the prior disposition of the soul tor self-awareness in its 
operations. His explanation contains two points, first, on the nature ot the 
soul as a 8p1r1t.l and aeco!1dlJ', on the compari8on with an intellectual habit 
implied. in the name applied b.Y st. Thomas. 
'!he human soul occupie8 a unique position among spiritual. substances. A8 
a ep1r.1t, it i8 a bej.ng graced with both intelligence and intelllg1b1llty. 
But as a spirit united with matter, the taculty ot intelligence is ordered to 
know in cooperation with aens~t1on. 'rhus the human knowing power is in the 
presence of a knowable object-ita own sub.tance.....w.t is prevented trom actual 
6nu.. mode ot phrasing the result of the actuation or habitual selt-
knowledge is traced to San Sever1~ whom Gardeil singles out as contributing 
greatq to his own thought. cr. Me~s '1'bom1stes, p. 219, n. 1. San 
Severino developed this id8a in· an an:t:::.ttantian epistemological context as he 
took up consciousness as a criterion of knowledge which reaches beyond 
P:henomena 1:.0 the concrete, existing self. cr. Georges van Rait, Lt 
ee1st.emoloS,1e thoaiste (Louvain, 1946), pp. 64-65. -
6 
knowledge of this object. This state of "prevented. knowledge" is what St. 
Thomas describes as the soul's ha.bitu.a.l knowledge of itself.7 
Fr. Gardeil, following the progression of the text of the De Veritate, 
-
comments on the aptness of the comparison of the relation of the soul to 
itself as a. present but unknowable object of knowledge ld,.th the rela.tion of a 
de'Veloped mind to its achieved knowledge through retained species in the 
mind.B 
'1'b.e work of Fr. Gardeil provides the actual point of departure for the 
work of this thesis. We wish to expand his explanation by resea.rch into the 
texts of st. '!'bemas in which .. can see the d.evelopment of the idea of 
habitua1 selt-knowJ.edge in the human soul. 
A _cond writer lIho haa taken up our text is Fr. Blaise Romeyer, S.J.9 
His work ranks as a peculiar contribution to the stream of discussion in 
Thomistic epistemology in the period betwen the World War.. He proposed an 
interpretation of St. Thomas which fea.tured a concrete intuition of material 
7"Force est done ~ 1'~ ,intelligente de dem.eurer en suspens vis-}-v18 de 
cet opjet qui lui est eependant immanent, qu'e1le a tout ce qu'il taut pour 
eonna!tre, _is dont eUe ne pe~ rh.llser la conna.issance actuelle In raison 
de sa consti,.tution organique prtylf!nte, qui 1a lie au cSrps dans son etr, at 
dans son operation. C'est eet etat de connaisaanee lies qui est appele par 
/' 
saint Thomas du noll de conna1ssance habitue1le." Gardei1, Me1a!l£!s Thomiste8, 
p. 224. 
B.'Aucun e~le ne saurai t m:1eUl) nous,. fa1re ente~ 14 structure 
interieure de 1t ame, naturellement iecondee p!u" e11e""lneme, dans 110rdre 
,. " ( intelligible, eomme,l\ltesprit du savant est feconde par l'eSP-Etce impres8e, ou, 
ce)lUi rev:l.ent au m.eme, par un habitus acquis), au point dtii'tre v1rtuell.ement 
pregnant. de l'act. de connaisaa.nce de so1." Ibid. 
-
9uSa.int Thomas et notre connaiasance de II esprit humain," Arahi vea de 
Philosoph1.e, VI (1928), 137-250. -
10 
slngu.l.are and a direct knowledge of spiritual realities. 
7 
The aspect of Romeyer' 8 work which pertains to our thesis is the survey be 
made of the Thomistic texts concerning the knovabi1ity of the human soul. His 
treatment of the doctrine of habitual. self-knowl.edgeU is in the manner of a 
paraphrase, with an added evaluation of the aptness of the word habitual in 
this context. On one hand the word. implies "too much" ai"nee the acquired 
habit supposes prev.i.ous exercise of the intellectual faculty. This is more tha1 
the innate diapoaition described by st. Thomas. On the other hand there is a 
wakness in the compari son in that the word. habitual ord.1naril\r indicates 
knowledge determine<ll'q a group ot species 'Which are in turn formed through the 
influence ot material objects. Habitual sc:i.entitic knowledge is thus an acci-
dental modif1cation of the mint1. But the soul's knowledge ot itself is eftn 
"more habitual," since its cause lies molly w1thin-in the very essence of 
the BOul. 'the operation of the laIow1ng faculty on some object is merel1' a 
condition tor the actuation of the soul's knowledge ot i tsell. 
A second pertinent aspect ot ROIIlt!J3'Grt s work is his discussion ot the soul'. 
lcnowledge of it sell' as tound 1!l the CommellY2z !!! ~ Sentencel" 12 His 
correlation of the Augustinian intell1gere w:tth habitual selt~knowledge proYide 
us with the starting point of our textual atudy. Our method, however, 1d.11 
lOcf. van Reit, pp. 483-487. 
~omeyer, Arehi'V8', VI, 193-19S. 
12Ibid., 188-191. 
-
8 
differ :in two major aspects from that of RomByer. Fu-st., the focus of all our 
stu<:\r remains on one passage of St. 'thomas. As the texts are taken up, we will 
be seeking light on the one text on habitual self-knowledge. Secondly, we ajm 
to use the !2! Veritate diacU8sions of self-knowledge in God and in the angels 
for their elaboration ot the general principles governing all instances ot a 
knower's knowledge ot himself. 
A third author 1IIhose work has played an important part in the prel.iminary 
steps of this thesis is Fr. J. Webert,o.P.lJ He baa pointed out the major 
text. to be studied and has made an order~ catalogue of all the types ~ 
re.tlective knowledge treated by st. Thomas. 
Another part of Webertls contribution to this thesis is his disOWIsion of 
"the metaphysics of refiection" in which he pointed to the Comment:a:z.2!l ~ 
L1ber .!!! ... C&...,U_S .... 1 8 ...... , Proposition F1.t'teen, e.8 a significant part ot st.. Thomas' 
thought.14 Our approach will be to stw:\v the importance of the Liber de Cauais 
-
proposition in two ~a. First, .. will examine carefullY' the use St. Thomas 
make. ot the proposition in passages prior to our central text. Secondly,. we 
will evaluate the CoJm!l8ntarx o.t St. Thomas tor its contribution to our under-
stand.ing ot the ground ot all selt-kDowledge in the human soul. 
A fourth author who haa treated. the doctrine of habitual aeU-kJ»wledp is 
13 ;" ,,/. 
"Ref'lexio....-etude ~ lea operations retlexivea dana la psychologie de 
saint Thomas d1Aquin,· Me±m!R!a Mandon:net (Pari., 1930), I, 285-32$. 
14 Ibid.., 320-324. 
-
9 
15 Fr. Georges Ducoin" S.J. The intention of rucointa paper was to tilow that 
for St. Thomas man is radic~ self-consciousnes8. He finds this idea 
implied in the very text we have chosen from the De Veritate. This equation of 
-
habi tua.1 sel.f-knowledge and a radical, or ontological, self-consciousness i8 
greatly reinforced by the explanation St. Thomas gi'Ves in his commentary on the 
fifteenth proposition of the Liber de Gausis. Fr. Dueoin justifies his stress 
-
on the cOl1Il1'lentary by evidence fran two texts of the !!!. Veritate 16 lhich, he 
argues, show that the explanation of this proposition is more than jU8t the 
exposition of the thought of another" but actually contains the personal 
thought of st. Thomas. 
In our study we will treat the use St. Thomas made of the tiber de Causie 
-
proposition both in the Commentarr .2! 2 Sentences and in the .!2!. Veritate. 
However, the evidence will force us to minimize the importance of this text in 
the thought of St. Thomas. In our tinal. chapter, we will exrunine the 
Commenta!I ot St. Thomas and our argument will be to interpret the passage as 
an instance ot st. Thomas g1 ving a full literal exposition of the thought ot 
another without any signitica~t interjection of his own thought. 
In view of these earlier studies ot B! Veritate, q. 10, e.. 8, we can 
restate the aim of this thesis. We propose to study the movement ot the mind 
15"L'homme camne conscience de soi selon saint 'lllomas dtAquin," Sapientia 
A,uinatilu Communicationes IV Oongressus Thomistic! Internationalis (Rome, 
1 $5), pp. 24'-2~. -
l6n. Ver., 2, 2 ad 2; and 1, 9 e. 
--
10 
of St. Thomas through lds earliest writings toward the formulation of the 
doctrine of habitual self-know1edge as stated in this part of ti1El ~ Ver:i.tate. 
\>le will start our quet3t tor under.tanding the doctrine of habitual 881£-
knowlede:e in tho b~"l soul by eX8lldnintt a t.ext in the Commen~.22 Jm. 
f~:nte!l!!." in 'Wh~,ch St. Thomas states +..hat the easenoe of the soul has It 'ftt17 
close slmilarity to an intellectual hlilbit. 
Ad pl"imum ergo diceudum quod ad 0.se habitus 1ntell&ct1v1 
d:uo concurruntl scU10et species intell1g1bw.. at l.tmrm 
inte1lectua agenti. quod tac1 t eel 1.ntelligibUem in actu: 
unCle Ed. aliQUfl, speci •• fU'J.t qua :tn. haberet lumen. illud 
baberet rnt10nem habitue, quantum pertinet ad hoc quod 6saet 
pM:ncip!a actus. Ita dieo, quod. quando ab am. occnoao1tur 
aliqu1d quod est in ipea non per sui td.milltudinea, sed per 
__ easentia. ipaa .... ntia rei cogi'itae est loco habiiiua. 
Unde· d1co, quod ipsa easentJa ~, prout •• t mota a se1paa, 
habet rat.:l.oIall bah! tua.1 
fhe context of this JlUItIilp 1. a question about 5t. Augustine 'a aecom 
deecr:ipt1on of bow an !.triage of the Trinity ia loUDe! in MD.. Thequeet1cm ia 
whether the triplet, _. rJDt.1t1a., !! !!J.r. really dU.ten from. the met. 
meaoria. ~;Uent1a. ~ volunt.u, 1tdch .. d18cu1JllllJd in the art1clea of tbe 
preceding question. 
The ~ given by st. Thomas is that the tirst ~.mage refers to three 
d1ttenlnt pow", ot the soul, while the second 1Mge considere the __ nee f:4 
lrn I sent •• .3, S, art. un. ad 1. 
- -" --
n 
12 
the superior part of the soul (mens) and the two consubstantial habits 
- 2 (notlt1al habitus memoriae and amor: habitus voluntatis). 
-
The first contrary opinion is based on the earlier affirmation th& t an 
image of the Trinity is :found in the human soul especially when the soul i teel 
is the object of its operations.3 The argument in the objection is that the 
soul knows itself by means of its own essence and not through the mediation of 
any habit. Thus, since II. habit is not found in the soul's knowledge of itself, 
an image involving the soul's habits, notitia and amor, is a poor repreaen'ta. 
-
tien ot the Trinity. 
The response to this opinion aims to show how the essence of the soul 
resembles an intellectual. habit, since the soul knows itself through its own 
essenee~ It is to be noted. that St. Thomas makes no formal acceptance of the 
proposition that the soul knows itself through its own essence. The force ot 
the response is that if the soul does know itself in the manner stated in the 
opinion-:l!! essentj.am ~then the image is sa'Wed because in this selt-
knowledge the essence of the soul functions ve;r.y much in the manner of an 
intellectuaJ. bab! t. 
'!'he argument of the response is based on the nature of an intellectual 
habit as an intelligible species in the intellect. The second :factor in the 
2fthaec assignatio sumitur secundum essentiam at habitus constibstantiales; 
praedicta autem secundum potentiaa.rt Ibid. sol. 
-
3Ibid., 3, 4, 4 sol. 
-
constitution of an intellectual habit ia the light of the agent intellect by 
which the species is made intelligible in aet. A m1ddle step in the argument 
is to consider how a species hav.tng intellectual ligl"it of itself would be like 
a habit, since it could of itself be a source (Eincipi'Ulll) of an act of 
knoWledge. Thus, if the essence of the soul leads to the knowledge of some-
thing, and since that essence is the source of intellectual light, that essence 
4 
would be f'unction1ng just like a hab1~ ~ habitus. Thus, in the 
knowledge of itself', involving no species but only the soul's essence, that 
essence is the source of the act of knowledge just as an intellectual. habit is 
the sourceS of the act of knowledge concerning something known habituaJ..ly. 
This first passage of our study ot bab1 tual self-knowledge in the 
Commen!.:!:l .2! .!!! Sentences is important as the one place before the central 
passage in the 1?!. _Ve ...... ri ......... ta ..... te .... in which the soul.' s knowledge of itself is d1rec1iq 
compared with habitual scientific knowle~1e. Thus, we have some explanation 
of the ~ used in the central passage in this thesis. However, the actual 
value o:t the passage in our quest for understanding is small. First, the h\YPo .. 
thetical. strain running throu~ the passage has been noted. Secondly, no 
preCise determination is made of the exact kind of knowledge the soul has of 
itself' through its essence. Thir~, o~ one causal factor regarding this 
hIbid., .3, $, !tl. ~. ad 1. 
5!ll habits are eources of acti'Vity in operative powrau "habitus, 
secundum proprietatem sui nominis, significa.t qualitatem qwundam quae est 
princ1pium actus, intormantem at perteeientem potent1am." In n Sent., 24, 1, 
1801. - -
kind of sel.f'-knowledge hall been memiomcb the tact t.hf.!t tb& aoul hu of 
itself'the l1t,llt of agent intel.leot. We must .. flZplanation oithe ulti_te 
ground. of this knowledge tile lIOul baa of 1tselt. 
we cmn move to the _COM pht.ee of our study of b.abituAl aelt-knovledp in 
the ~=z ~ !2! fienten •• b7 ~ to 8Upp~ tor the aeoond datio1ency 
noted a'bo\1t. ~le win lie_ t.o answer this question Wb~ ch .. will phrase in 
tems of the p&aae.ge just atud1e41 since the aoul baa 1rrt.ell111ble light of 
6 iteelt. does the soul. know itselt ~., 
Mce tbts question 1s Ii-n o:.pl1elt treatment in the ~Jl!:!tl 2!l ~ 
Sentences. In tbe ar\icle 1mmecUateq i.-tore tbe one .. haft just examined, 
st. 1'homa8 ... whether tbe ratic:mal powere are u_s in act nth regard to 
the objects towards Which the lJOul teat ... q>lit1ea an 1mage 0:£ the Tr1ni t,y. 
These two Ob~ of knowledge and low are God and the soul itself. 7 In a 
later art1c"JJJ8 be diaeu ... our ~ of our own habits ard po~rsJi and. in 
the response to the fourth objection in this second article he touooes on the 
8Oul*a knowledge ot !tselt. 
We 1f1l1 find it helpful to study st. 1homes t tNat .. nent of the question in 
both pusaaea Ednce bis negative answer in the .first pas~ is based on a 
~ t.l:. ccapari80D with habitual aell'..cnowladge appeare to rule out 
continual actual knowledge, sUll m. 'qu.at1on de_"", attention. Moe St. 
'lhomrulJ deseribQ the soul as reing preaent to itselft 1fetiam ardol'la Bild. ipa1 
praeaena ealt," (Ib1ct., 3. 1, 2 ad 3), and "crum 1pn. an1ma natu:ral1ter dt a1b1 
praeRl'Jll," (rb~, 1,. l~ sol.). "the question then raeins Whether thi. 
p1"9Mnce Cttn~8 the union with the 1.n:telligible object wtLiah 18 _sentla1 
in krto1fl.edge. 
1Ibid.., 3, h, !). 
-
8!b1d., 17, 1, 4 ad 4. 
reason of fact end in the second on a reason of right proceeding from the 
necessary mode of human knowledge. Thus" j.n both articles we will find an 
early treatment bY' St. Thomas of a question of continual self-knowledge" a 
question all.ied. to ours of the habitual knowledge the soul is said to have of 
itself. 
1'he first solution begins with a distinction of the three wrds used by 
st. Augustine regarding knowledge. There follows the first part of the answer 
to the question whether the soul knowe itself (or God) always: 
Secundum August1num, l!! utUitate 0redend1, cap. xi, 
differunt cogita.re. diacernere J at intelligere. Disoernere 
est oognoscere rem per dif'ferentiam sui ab aliis. Cogitare 
auts est cons ide rare rem secundum partes at proprietates 
suaSI 1nde dicitur quasi coag1tare. Intelligere autem dicit 
nlliil aliud quam simplicem intuitum intellectue in 1d quod 
sibi est praesens intelligibUe. Dico ergo, quod anima non 
semper cogitat et discernit de Deo, nee de 88, quia siC 
quU1bet sciret naturaliter totam n"'turam an1mae suae, ad 
quod v:tx magno studio perveniturJ ad talem enm cognitionem 
non suffiei t praesent1a rei quolibet modo J sed oportet ut 9 
sit ibi in ratione objecti, et exigitur intentio cognoscenti •• 
Thus the reason that the soul does not know itself allFcl\rS, in the sense 0 
cogi tare or discernere, 1s the clear fact that all men do not know the nature 
of their soul--a neoessary consequence if the questioned proposition were 
true. 
In s¢ng that disoernere and coew" require presence precia.~ as an 
objeot" st. Thomas has touched on the reason of right wioh is the sole answer 
in the other passage on this question. The natural mode of human knowledge is 
:i.ndicate4 ·when he AY1J that an int4tnM.on (or apee18.10) is required in knoW1ng 
the natura c4 the soul. 
In prooeeeding to treat the AUt.,~ ~!t!B!re, st. Thanns does &l.l.ov 
SOM t,pe of cont.j.m.uU oolt-knoWledgel "Sed secundum quod lntelJ.1gere rdh1l 
al:1u.d est quam praesentia intellifg1bil1s ad 1nt.elleetl.R quoeUMq'tJe modo, 810 
anima JlIWm'pel" intellig1t _ e\ ~.ll. 
We can enter almoat paren~ tlle last. sentence. 0.£ the first 
patlllit8ge wtd.cb Ii-, aa another way the soul could be BIdet to be known always. 
tbe rut that in every act of knoWledae the light at agent int4l.le<Yt and the 
reaep\i:v1v of the possible 1nt.elleot are involWl4. 
Al10 ta.men l!lOdo, aecunctura pb.U.oaopboe, 1ntell1g1tur quod aniM 
_nper .. intelligit, eo quod G1lU1IlJ quod ~ntelllg1tur, non :in-
tel.l!situr n1ad. 1ll.wstratua lUJJd.rwt intellectwJ ag81ttu et 
receptull in :Llltellectu posaibil1. Unde aieut in omni colore 
Y1detur l.1.I8l eorpo~, ita in ami inteU1g1hU1 Y1dev 
1 .. 0 intel.lectwJ agentiaJ nop_tamen in l"1'.t1one objec'td, sed 
in mtlona medii COgno8C8nd1.U 
The MOomi paaeage in llhioh st. Tbomas tclucbee on t~ queat:1on or 
continua1 selt-knowledge gives ue an anNU" bead on tbenecea.ry mode of 
human knowinl'h The principle is announced in the 'body of the solution. 
lOr..1'. !!! Ver., 10, 8, vhere st. ThfDaS quotes .AWl"l'Oe8, "1:ntelleow 
1ntel11a1' per1ntentlonem in eo, aiout i.n al1a irttelllg1b1l!a." st. 'lbcaaa 
then explairut, aquae quidem 1ntenM.c njJlil alind set quAtn species 
inteU1g!b1Us.-
llIn I tent.,), 4, S sol. The Parma edition adds the vord indeterm1nate 
as the ta.t ;o'i!d of the _ntence and so ,ntudere this type of knowIitG eVen •. 
more teuuoua. 
Quia cum intellectus noster potentialis sit in potentia ad 
omnia intelligibilia, et ante intell1gere non sit in actu 
aliquod sorum} ad hoc quod inte1ligat actu, oportet quod re-
ducatur in actum per species aeceptas a. senaibus 1llustratas 
lum1ne intellectus agent!s •••• Unde cum naturale 81ii 
nobis procedere ex sensibus in intell1gibilia, ex etfectibus 
in causas, ex posterioribus in priore • • • 1deo est quod 
potentiu animae et hab! tus non possumus cognoscere nisi per 
actus at actus per objecta.13 
17 
rhus ... see that to be present to the intellect precisely as an object of 
understandi.ng neana to be present as dariwd t.rom sense data. This is the 
natural orientation of the human intellect which governs sl.1 our knowledge, 
even of the interior realities such as the powers of the soul and the habits 
or virtues. 
In the anawer to the fourth opinion in the article, St. Thomas applies 
this principle to the case of the soul.' s knowledge of itself. In tba last 
sentence he returns to the A.ugustinian sense of intelligere as a. possible way 
of haVing continual. self-knowledge in the soul. 
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ad hoc quod aliquid cognoscatur 
ab anima, non sutficit quod sit sibi praesens quoeumque modo, 
sed in ratione object!. Intellectui auteln nostro nihil est 
secundum statum viae praesens ut objectum, nisi per a1iquam 
similitud.1nem ipsius, vel BOO effectu acceptam. quia. per et-
fectus devenimus jn causas. Nt ideo ipsam animam et poten-
tias ejus et habitus ejus non cognosc:tmus nisi per actus, qui 
eognoscuntur per objeeta. Nisi largo mock> ftl:imus loqui de 
cognitione, ut Augustinus loquitur, secundum quod intell1gen 
nihil allud !pt quam praesentialiter intellectui quooumque 
modo adesae.J4 
13Ibid .• , 17 J 1, 4 sol. 
-
14 ~ ... ad 4. 
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Thus our question whether the soul knows itself always has been answered 
with a definite negative answer regarding knowledge in :l. ts proper sense. The 
reasons are that 1) de facto .. men do not naturally' know the nature of the soul) 
---
and 2) 2!. jure, the soul is not ali1f'8\V'8 present to t he intellect in the manner 
which human knowledge requires. In a very wide sense, however, it can be said 
that the soul knows itself because of the presence of the soul to the 
intellect. '!'his presence can be termed, t..l1e ontoloi!cal presence of a SUbject 
to the power which emanates from itself'. 
The type of presence indicated by the August:lnian sense of intelligere may 
well aid us :in understanding habitual self-knowledge. In the .E!. ... Ve_ri ....... ta...,te .. the 
likeness to a bahi t 1s based on the presence of the essence of the soul to 
itself'. In the tllO passages 'We have just examined these two phrases were 
indirectly appl:ie d to the soul t s mode ot presence, "praesentia intelligihills 
ad intellectum quocumque modo" J and "praesent1ali ter intellectu1 qUGcumque modo 
ade ••• n Thus the ontological presence described in tb!l se passages ln8\V be 1) 
middle term. joining habitual self'-know18dge and the Augustinian intell:1ere 
into an equivalence; and 2) an indication of the cause of habitual self-
knowledge. This last point is right at the heart of this thesis and we will 
return to it when we take up the explanation of our central passage. 
A third phase of our study of the Co:mmenttlIX .2!l !:.h!. Sentences will be to 
expand what we have read a.bove about the method the soul must follow 1n coming 
to know its habits, powers, and eventually itself. lIm1 .fI.re these interior 
realities to be known which cannot be present to us a.s derived from sense 
data? 
In two passa.ges _ have alree.~ touched on the method. It ha.s been 
19 
described by the general name of "reasoning £rom objects to acts and from acta 
to the power.»15 Secondly, its necessity was based on our natural orientation 
16 
to reach intellig:i.ble objects through the sensible. 
We find a more systematic explanation of this method in a later passage.17 
The question is whether we can know our own habits. St. Thomas first div.1.des 
the question into 1) a treatment of knowing them in their quiddity (secundum ~ 
~ m)' and 2) a treatment of knowing them in their properties (SU!ntum!! 
!! quae lpsam COnsequWltur). Then he eli videa the question of knowledge of the 
quiddity of habits into 1) knowledge of what they are (quid!!!h and 2) 
knowledge that they are (an est). This last division parallels the diVision of 
--
the body of the response j.n our central passage in the De Veritatel thus, we 
-
stand to gain :trom examining St. Thomas' discussion of the second hall' of the 
question. 
In explaining our knowledge of the nature of a habit, st. Thomas specifies 
the reasoning process described above as a movament from. the actions to their 
proportionate eauset "habitus ipsos per actus cognoac1mus, sieut eausam per 
effectum. Et quia nos aUIDHlUS ~usa aetuum, ideo actus eognoscimu,. per aetum 
rationis imestigantis quid sit necessarium in actu 1110 ex proportio1'l8 
object! boni et finis." 18 
15ftmaxima d1ftieultas est in cognitione an:bnae, nee devenitur in ipsam 
nisi ratioeinando ex objectis in actus at ex actus in potent!am." Ibid., 3, 1, 
2 ad 3. -
16Ibid., 17, 1, h sol. Cf. p. 17 above. ' 
-
17In III Sent., 23, 1, 2 801. 
- -
Far more important for us is the descr:tption of the way one knows the 
existence of his own babita: 
Sed i1le qui habet habi tum • • • cognosci t sa habere babi tum 
1nquantum percipit inclinationem sui ad actum., secundum quam 
Be habet aliqua.liter ad actum llllllil. Et hoc quidem cognoseit 
homo per modum ref1ectionis, in quantum scilicet cognoscit se 
operari quae operantur. Et ideo dicit Augustinus quia 
buius modi habj, tus cognoscuntur per suam praeeentiam. quantum 
ad hunc modum.19 
There are four things to be noted from this passage' 1) By the use of 
the 'WOrd pgrcigit ~ can establish a similarity with our central E! Veritate 
text, a slmilarity over and above the methoc.ological structure of the two 
articles. In both cases the word Ji:!!2iIrl;t refers to our knowledge of the 
existence of an inner reality of the huroan person. 2) A step toward this 
knowledge of one's own habits is that a person knows himself to be the agent 
or source of an activity_ 20 3) The action by which a person canes to this 
knowledge is called a reflection. It) 'l'he ceuse of this knowledge is said by 
. 
Augusti.1l6 to be simply the presence of the babi t. 
'!hese points indicate that this questJ.on bears definitely on our study at 
the soul's knowledge at itself._ If a tentative analogy may be made, we can s 
that because of the presence (4) of the soul to itself, there is a refieetion 
0) imro1ved in ita operations in which it perceives (1) that it exists as the 
~ere we find a remote textual justification for the interpretation of 
San Severino and Gardeil. Cf. p. 5 abo"fe. 
21 
a.gent (2) or proport.iona:te cause of the operat.ion. 
We ldll proceed by seeking to amplify our understanding of reflection as 
treated in t.he Commentary- .22 ~ Sentences. We can begin by examining t.he 
answer to the third opinion in the question studied above. st. Thomaa first. 
describes the refiection leading to knowledge of the nature of the soul: 
"Intellectus autem, ut dicitur in nl De Anima, sicut. alia, oOgIlOscit. 8eipsum, 
-
quia scilicet. per speciem non quidem sui, sed object)., quae est forma. ejus; ex 
qua. cognoscit actus sui naturam, at ex na.tura. actus naturam potent1ae 
cognoscentis, et ex natura potentiae naturam 8ssentiae, et per consequens 
21 
al1.srum potent1arum." This is the method described in the second. half of 
our central 12! .... V_er_j_ta_te_ text. and the way we haw already seen the soul t s 
knowledge of itself described.22 
'!'he a.dvance made in this trea_nt of the soul's knowledge of itself is 
in the Mention made of a second kind of reflection -which leacls to knowledge of 
the existence of the soul's acts. In the present passage, the fact of such a 
re.fleetion is just stated along wi t.h the explanation that such an operation c 
onl¥ be had in a power that has no bodi~ organ: 
.Al.1o modo anima reflectitur super actus suos cognoseendo illos actos 
esse. Hoc autem non poteat esse ita quod aliqua potentia utens 
organo corporall ref1ect1tur super actum. propril.U!l, quia oportet quod. 
instrumenturn ead$ret medium inter ipsam potentiam et instrumentum 
quo primo eognoseebat. • •• Intelleetus autem cum sit potentia non 
utens organa carpor-ali, poteet cognoscere actum suum., secundum qwd 
patitur quodammodo ab objecto at informatur per speciem objecti."""2J 
2lIbid., ad 3. 
-
22 Ibid., 3. 1, 2 ad .3 and 17, 1, 4 801. 
-
23rn In Sent., 23. 1, 2 sol. 
- -
Th'U8 _ ..,. draw this diettnction 'b«bveen tho two Id.nda of're1"l.eetiODI 1) 
netleoti.on <'»1 the ooture ot tbe 110\11 or of' a habit 18 a type ot inqu.1r'.1 or 
stu.d¥ of a dileund.'V$ nntlJ1'e te81nrj,ng with study of the object. at knowledge 
or wlltion and lead1.ng to understa.'t:'d1nr, ot the nature o,f the act, or ot the 
:power, or even of the nature of the soul, the subject ot Inlch operations. Tbe 
emphaaia in all of ttda 18 on the quidd:1.ty or tale1ty of tl'ase int.erior 
real1t1ea. 2) Reflection on the ex1stenoe of the acta or hahi te i. baled on 
the independence of the lntellect and Will of Jtlaterial orprdJ in tlte1r 
operationa~ 'this hut kind of retl6et1on call.s tor further stud.Y_ 
Two t1lma 5.n the ~n!:!t:z.:a ~ ~.~., st. Thcna8 haa ment.1oned. 
this re.naction Wh~ eh tells uti that. OUt" operation exists. In the t1ret 
pasage,* he 111 explain1ng how our de.b .. tor, and enjOyment at, an end 
coale .. _ With desire am .n~ :re~.ng ttle opernt1on by whiob ". reacm 
that end. !b.1a aspect of the wUl's cpoft.tion 1s :pare.llal w:1th the act of the 
intellect. Vl'IBN • UD.raratand an object and understand. that .. ~tend in 
the ... operation. '1'b.s second pa8aaae25 t1ncbJ the identity of the intellect's 
uaiEt~ of It_lt aD! of· ita Dot of aeU-underatanding as an a"1llogy with 
the 'lr101t.y where there is l'lOt another act ot love by .1iCh the loft be~n 
Father .an4 Son i8 an object. of 10'98. 1bus this :reflection in Which we kDov 
I 1 , I r 
2Sttnon aUo actu potentia tftJ't,ur ~j'j' objectum .t j.n actwl su_, eodem enUl 
actu intellectus intel.l1g1t .. et intel.l.igit .. 1ntelllgere." JIbid., 10, 1, S 
ad 2. 
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our intellectual act is concomitant (eadem 0E!ratione) with those acts and 
is characterized by directness and immediacy. 
The cause ot this second kind of reflection has been indicated as the 
immaterlility ot these intellectual operations.26 This is significant since 
the r.dm of this thesis is to explain the passage whe~ +.lle cause of the soul' 8 
actual knowledge ot i tselt is gi 'nn as its habi tnal knowledge of i tselt 
through its essence. For a complete expla.nation of habitual selt-knowledge in 
the soul we will haw to determine the exact relationship of the soul's 
immateriality to the state of habitual knowledge of the soul. 
We will now turn to the fourth part of our stutW of the Commen:t!n: .2!! ~ 
Sentences and examine more in detail how ilmnateriality is the cause or 
immedia:te renection. In one ot the treatments ot renection St. Thomas states 
that a material power does not reflect on its operations, but that an 
immaterial power does reflect.27 Two line s of explanation for Ulis tact are 
taken ups 
1) Et ideo dicendum quod potent1ae immateriales refieetuntur 
super sua objecta; quia intellectus intelligit Be intelligere, 
at similiter voluntas vult se wUe et diligit se dilige:re. 
Cuius ratio est, quia actus potentiae immateriills non ex ... 
clud1tur a ratione object!. Objectm enim voluntatis est 
bomnl1j et sub hac ratione dilig1t volunta.s OIllDB quod diligit.; 
ideo potest diligere actum suum inquantum est bonus) at s1.mi1-
i tar est ex parte intellectusl 
2) .t propter hoc, libra De causis, proposit1o XT, dieitur quod 
cujuscumque actio reditin esaentiam agentis per quamdaa 
re1.'lectionem., oportet 8ssent1am ejus ad seipsam redire, i ~ est 
26 In III Sent., 23, 1, 2 sol. 
- -
27 5 In I Sent., 17, 1, ad 3. 
- -
in se subaistentem eSHA, non super aliud delatam, id est non 
dependent.em a materia.20 
The first reason behind imnediate refiection is that the acts of the 
immaterial powers are jncluded in the transcendent objeots of these same 
powers. The :implication j8 that the operation of the intelleot is itself able 
t.o be understood fundamentally because it ie and so is convertible with the 
- -
true-the transcendent objeot of the intellect. Surely this is an 
-
expla.nation which can be ampl:i.fied into a metaphysical explanation of the 
knowability of the habits of the intellect, of the power itself, and of the 
soul as the SOUToe of the power. Thus, as the intelleot comes to know an 
intelligible object there are at once a group of knowable, am.2! .. t&C;;.;> .... to ... known, 
, 29 
realities present in the act of knowing. Still, we have not reached an 
explanation of :immateriality as a ground of the possibility of reflection. Let 
us study the seoond part of the above passage for such a causal explanation)O 
It will be helpful to analyze the content of the last five lima of the 
text into four parts s 
28.!,u I ~., 17, 1, 5 ad 3. The author has divided the text. 
29Thi8 suggests a description of knowing as havin~ a first stage in which 
objecti.ve and subjeotive (the act, the power, the soul) elements are known as 
confused parts of the whole. We read that such an ocourrence i8 possible: 
"partes possunt intelligi dupllcitera uno modo sub quadam confusiona, prout 
aunt in toto; et sic simul cognoeeuntur per unam f01"ll8li1 totius, at s1c simul 
cognoscuntur.-S.T., I, 8S, 4 ad 3. 
--
3Or.his passage does not contain a literal quotation of the tiber de 
Causis. It is a paraphrase of the passage including the fifteenth proposition 
and the .five explanato:r;,v statements which accompany the proposition" The same 
propoSition, "Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam, est rediens ad essent1sm. 
suam reditione eompleta.," is also used in In II Sent., 19, 1 .. 1, to substantiab 
a proof for the 1mmateriality of the soul Which 'haSbeen built on the 
retlect1ve act of the soul. 
2$ 
1) A gi'Veni An agent wlth immediately retlective operations. 
2) A consequences The essence of that agent '·return." upon itselt. 
3) F:irst explanation of that "return": Subsisterlce-not being spread 
through matter. 
4) Second explanation: Independence ot matter. 
Here we meet a radically d1:f'terent way of speaking about the human soul. 
The Neo-natonic description has the soul "bent back" on i tsalf in its 
essence. SUch a picture is suggestive to the jmagination, but it ia not ot 
itself satisfying to the understanding. However, it is clear that a familiar 
principle governs the transit from the first part of the text to the second 
part. The movement is according to the principle that the mode of operation 
follows the mode ot being. Thus, if the soul :returns upon itself in ita 
operation of' knowledge, it must. also be marked by a substantial or essential 
return upon itself. 
The fourth part of the text connects the Neo-Platonic description with 
the :i.mmater1e.lity of the soul. .FrClll what we saw above,31 this is pertinent to 
the problem of the soul's habitual selt-knowledge. 
Let us draw up the results of our study of the Commentaz:z 2! tbe 
Sentence. into definite conclusions. 
First, there is no proper sense in which the soul knows itself 
continually. ThUll, habitual aelf'-lalowledge cannot mean continual self-
knowledge in the human soul. 
Secondly, the natural or:i.entation of the human intellect is to find its 
31 
ct. p. 23, above. 
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intelligible object in what is presented in phantasms. Thus the soul. does not 
have itself as a direct object of knowledge but must use a discursive process 
in coming to know 'What it is. 
Thirdly, two types of reflection have been noted: a) the discursiw 
return of the intellect to gain knowledge of its own nature-what it is J and 
b) :immediate return by- which a man knows concomitantly with his operation that 
the operation is taking place. 
fourthly, the reason for the immediate reflection is the independence of 
the soul from matter. This last fact has also been described as a substantial 
or essential return of the soul upon itself. 
Along with these conclusions, ,. can point to four questions regarding 
habitual self-knowledge Which call for a.nswers; 
FirSt, is the habitual knowledge the soul has ot itself to be understood 
as equivalent to the :i.mmateriality- of the soul? 
Secondly', is the immediate reflection of the soul on its operations the 
actuation of its habitual knowledge of itself. 
Thirdly, is it possible to have knowledge that something is, apart from. 
all knowledge of the nature of that thing? This seems to be implied from the 
distinction of the two kinds of reflection. 
Fourthly, what is the complete explanation of these two descriptions of 
the soul a a) "present to 1taelf," and b)"essentia~ returning upon itselt"? 
How are these phrases to be connected with the habitual knowledge the soul has 
of itself? 
27 
Those are the questions we will seek to answer in our stuctv of the De 
-
Veritate. First, we will seek to expose the general principles governing all 
knowledge and especially all reflective knowledge. Then, we will turn to our 
study of habitual self..-knowledge in the human soul.32 
32we must explain the omission of De Veritate, 1, 9, a passage in which 
St. Thomas surely does treat of the knowerts knowledge of himself. We pass it 
owr in this thesis since it describes a special instance of reflection on the 
nature of the soul. According to this text, along with the scientific study of 
the nature of the soul, we must include the knowledge of the nature of one t s 
knowing power which is had in every judgment. It is of the natUl"$ of the 
j~nt that the intellect come to an imxnediate grasp of itself as a knower. 
In its act, the mind knows its own dynamic quality. This is more than 
perception ot the existence of oneta operation. But it is not formal 
scientific knowledge of the nature of the intellect and of the soul. All St. 
Thomas points to is that the mind judging of reality knows itself as a being 
In.ade to know what is. This is beyond the scope of our study of the bab! tual 
disposition underlying the soul's knowledge of its own existence. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DE VERITATE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF AU. _ ............................. 
KNOWLEOOE AlIiD SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
In this chapter we will examine the articl.es on divine and angelic self-
knowledge in the £! _Ve_ri ........ ta .... te .... wi.th the sSm of singling out the general principle 
which. guide st. Thomas in working out his explanation ot each of these 
subjects. We will then put these principles to use in the next chapter in 
elaborating a complete explanation of habitual self-knowledge in the human 
soul.. 
In taking up the question of God IS ¥..llOwledge of Himsel:r, st. Thomas 
indicates that his solution is to begin with an absolute consideration of the 
requirements for knowledge itselt. "UMe ad oonsiderandum. qualitcr Deus 
seipsum cognosoat, oportet videre per quam naturam aliqu:1.d 8i t cognoacens et 
1 
cognitum.." 
The first step is a discUS'sion in cler-.r and simple terms of what 
knowledge is, considered according to its ontological purpose. Knowledge is 
one ~ for a creature to increase its perfection Over and above the perfection 
it has as a member ofa particular species. 
The problem is that of the ontological. limitation of created beings. 
1ne Ver., 2, 2 c. 
--
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Sed. quia esee apec1t1cUM urdua rei eet d.1st.:t.nct. ab e_ .. moo 
alterius rei, ideo in qlUl.l.1bet re creata hu1uamodi perteetion1 
babitae in unaquaque 1'&, tantum deeat de pertectlone Irl.mpl.iciter, 
quantum pertectius jn allis spec1ebWs 1nven1turJ ut ctt1usllbet rei 
perteot1o in 88 conaideratae sit 1mperfec:ta, veluti para tot1_ 
perfectionia uni vers1, quae consurgi t ex s1.:ngul.arulll rerum 
peJ"teotioD1bua, irt9'ioem congrepUs.2 
!he solution to this ontological l.bd tat10n 1s k:novledge, by ltbioh one 
creature can approprlt\te to 1t_l1' the proper perfeotions belc:mp.ng to other 
things. 
Uncle ut hula imper.fee~,on:1 aliquod remedimn & •• t, invenitur aliua 
modus periectionis in mbwi oreet,1s, secundum quod Pl~rfectiO quae 
•• t proptt1a urdu rei, in altera re 5..m7enitur. et haec eat 
perteetio cognoscenti. in quantum est cognoscana, quia secundum hoc 
a oogno.oente al1qu1d Cogno80i tur quod ipsum cogni tum. aliquo modo 
est apud oognoacentem.3 
From this int.ro4uct1on to the probla at hlUld, we can learn something about 
the place held 1n the mind of st. 1bomaa 'qy auch a question 'u. OUl"8 of h'l.'llM 
selt-knowledge. We &\!lIM in these tete 1bf.!t knowledgu 1. titte4 into a 
teleologicel achele of un1wl"Al JII"OPGl"tiONJ. The knowledge spoken of iI 
lIho~ objective. It fuUm. 1ta function in flsaimllat1.ng other being .... 
objec~ the lmo_r and thus caJ"rying h1m along to greater perf'ectton. Even 
po....aion of the vnole urdWirM in 1:.h1s manner ia not too great an acll1e...-nt 
for the human lP1r1t.h By some, jut such a conquest of realit.y ia posited NI 
2Ib1d 
_. 
the goal of human life. Questd.ona of the wbjen'" conaoioua po~n of 
hmmlt a.1'8 relegated to a seeondar.r 1eftl ot importance.S 
From treatment oJ: t.he put"J:IOIIG of ln1OW'l.edr,., st. 11u:au goes on to a _.raJ 
consideration of the mode of ita realimtion. liov Will the known perfection be 
fit the same t:!me in the kIlower and in its proper subject? It cannot b!a 
aaeim1lated aocording to the __ determined .,de ot ex1atenoe which it ha$ in 
tbe nat\tral 8Ub3ect. It I1U8t be ir£ the ~r 8a'lIIehow without its natural 
determins;id.on.6 
Thus, with brevi-v and careful d1rectuea., st. '1l1OJUlll has caae to the 
point, of stating the pr1msJ7 pr1noiple governing ell the 1.netanee. of 
knowledge, 
Itt' qu1a tonue ot periect10nee nt1'UIa pel" mater:t_ ~ur, 1nde 
est quod aeoundum hoc eet ali.qua 1 ... cognoscib1l18 secundum quod a 
materia I/I8PIU"8tur. Unde oporte' quod.tam 1d 1n q_ ~_ 1ial18 
1'81 perteebio.. ,sit imrulterialeJ _ si enim 8sset _terlale, pertect10 
~ ... t in GO ~ aliqUod ... detel'ld.natull, et ita !IIJD 
enet 111 eo secumun quod est cognoscibil1aJ so1licet pt."out, ex:iatena 
perfect10 untus cat nata. ... '.n al.tero.7 
'rhe tiNt cons1derat.ion ie that the dtltem1nation of forme and pertect.1ofla 
18 by _tter. The conclWl1<m :1a that knowab1l1ty demand.B 118parat1on bcm 
SmUll st. ~s ~rlaJ in In IX Hat ... 11, n. 2617, OHie videtur 
princ1pal1e actio, ut al1qu1. 1nt.e"1lipnntelligib1le. Quod autem al1qtd.. 
intell!gat _ 1ntell1gere intelligibile, hoc v1detur e888 praeter princtpalaa 
aotum, quaa1 aooeaaoriurn quoddam." 
6aPerteot1o a\1.tellt uni'WJ :rei in altere. e.. non poteat seound.'um detendnat\ll\ 
~ •• quod babe, :in roe Ula, et ideo ad boo q'l»d nata sit ._ in 1"8 altera, 
Dportet au considerare absque hie quae nata aunt Mm detominare." De Vcr., 2, 
2 --o. 
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determining mat.ter. Regarding the power to know, the conclusion is parallel: 
a knower must be a receiver ot pertections. The reception rrmst. take place in 
an immaterial manner. The reason appears :in considering how matter receives 
a perfection according to one determined mode of existence and 80 rules out the 
otherness ot the form which is received in knowing. 
A first conclusion of this part of our study is that things have the power 
to know proportionately to their immater:i.a1ity: "secundum ord.5.nem 
. 8 
immaterial1tatis in rebus, secundum hoc in eis natura cognitionis invenitur." 
The same proportion is found concerning the knowabill ty of things: "Similiter 
est etiam ordo in COgnoscibilibus.u9 
A brier general application at this principle shows that the universe is 
divided into things only potential.ly knowable and things of themselves 
knowable. The things potentiaJ,q knowable require the operation ot agent 
intellect upon them to render them immaterial and thus apt for assimilation in 
knowledge. St. Thomas adds that the immaterial things, though more knowable by 
their nature, ere less knowable by us,10 since, as .. haft seen, the hllDlan 
11 
mind is by' nat1ll"e orientated to take its object fr(ll1 sensible things. 
lO"Sed res immateriales aunt inte1ligibiles per seipsasJ unde aunt magis 
nota.e secundum naturam, quamvis minus notse nobis. If Ibid. 
-
11 ct. p. 17, a.bove. 
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The conclusion of the article is brief. God, as purely spiritual, is at 
once the supreme knower and the most knowable being. Thus, His existing 
nature is who~ knowable and knowing. The perfect identity of the objective 
and subjective requirements for knowledge r,rounds the perfect self-grasp which 
is God's knowledge of Himsel:t .12 '!his is the first application of the 
universal principle that knowledge is proportionate to immateriality on the 
part of both subject and object. 
In the a.nswer to the second opinion in this same article, st. Thomas gives 
an explanation of the tiber de Causie proposition on self-knowledge, "Omnis 
----......... 
sciens essent1am est redians ad essentiam suam red! tiona completa. n We shall 
study the text in detail since it is the definitive statement St. Thomas makes 
on his understanding of the proposition.1) 
The objection proposes on the authority of the Liber .2! Causis that Ii 
thing which knows its own essence must experience a complete return-reditio 
12ltQuia igitur Deus est in rine separat10nis a materia, cum ab omni 
potent1alitate sit penitus imtnunisJ relinquitur quod ipse est max:ime 
cognosci ti ws, at max1me oognoscibilis. tt Ibid • 
. -
llrhe tw:o places where the proposition appeared in the Comment!;lZ on the 
sentences were llteral synopses of the proposition and its eipta!iation rn the' 
tiber a:e Cawsi.. In De Veritate, 1, 9, it is used to substantiate the 
d8scription of the re'?reetive powers of intellectual beings, but the proposi-
tion is not explained. The explanation found in S. T., I, 14, 2 ad 1, synop-
sized the explall8tion found here in the De Veri tate.- The Summa text shows 
some wrbal preeis.1ons: "Dicendum quod redire ad essentiam suarn. nihil aliud 
est quam rem subsistere in seipsa. Forma en1m, inquantum perrieit rnaterism 
dando ei esse, quodammodo supra ipsam effunditur; in quantum vero in seipsa 
habet esae, in seips8IIl redit. Virtutes 19:i.tur cognoscitivae quae non aunt 
subs1stentes, sed actus aliquorum organorum, non eognoscunt seipsas, siout 
patet in singul1s sensfbus. Sed virtutes aognosei ti vae per Be subsistentes 
cogIlOscunt seipsa •• " We will take up the content of St. Thomas' Commentary on 
the tiber .2! _Ca ... u ... s .... i.... s in Chapter V. 
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OOPlPleta-upon its own essence. However, in God there can be no return upon 
the essence, since in no way does God go out away from H:l.mselt. Thus, 1 ..t self 
knowledge must involve this return, there can be no eelt-knowledge in God. 
In the first part ot the answer to the opinion, St. Thomas explains the 
metaphorical way in whioh the return must be understood. The first part of 
his explanation concerns understanding as such and not just as found in God. 
Ad secundum dicendum quod locutio haec qua dicitur, quod seiens 
ee, a.d eS8entiam SU8m. redit, est loeutio metaphorical non enim in 
inteUigendo 8st motus, ut probatur in nll Phlsieo~. Dnde ~C; 
proprie loquendo, est fbi recessus aut reditus; sed pro tanto d1citur 
esse proQ!tpsus vel motus, in quantum ex uno oOgIlOscibili pervenitllr 
ad a11ud.lh 
St. Thous then proceeds to show how the proposition can be a.pplied to 
desoribe the disoursi"" type ot refiection found in the knowledge a man has 
or his own soul. However, this use of the proposition to describe nU-
knowledge cannot be applied to Oodt 
Sed in nobis proeesSUJI vel motus tit per quemdam discursum, secund:um 
quem est exitus 8t reditus in.an:imaJn nostrmn, dum oognoscit seipsam. 
Primo autem actus ab ipsa exiens teminatur ad objectum; et deinde 
reflectitur super actum.; at delnde super potentiam at essentiam, 
secundum quod actus eognoscuntur ex objectis et potentiae per actus. 
Sed in divina cognitione non est aliquis disoursus, ut prius diotum 
est quasi per notum in ignotum deftniat.15 
The final part of the answer gives the basic explanation of what this 
return upon one'. essence really is. ~~\stow~ 
V LOYOLA .,..~\ 
l' UNIVERSITY 140e Ver., 2, 2 ad 2. 
-- L/8RAR--( 
l'Ibid. A posBible type or discursive MOvement in God is seen in 
consider.J:'iig the objects ot his knowledge. Considering creatures. God rinds 
a likeness to H:J..msf!l£ and thus is brought back to His own essence again where 
He views these creatures in the first place. 
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Sed tamen sciendum, quod reditio ad essentiam in libro de Caus1s 
n:illil aliud dici tur nisi subsistentia rei in seipsa. F"O'rmae errllu 
in se non subsistentea, aunt super al1ud eftusae et nul.lat.enus ad 
seipsas colleetae; sed formae in se subsistentes ita ad res alias 
effunduntur, ea, pertieiendo .. vel eis intluendo, quod in seipsas 
per Be ma.nent.l6 
Here, in St. Thomas' e:xplanation, as in the actual text of the Liber ~ 
17 Causis, the return involved in selt-knowledge is the ground for explaining 
the mode of being of the knower which is capable of sud>. a return. The value 
of the present explanation is that it is a causal explanation based on the 
relation of a form to its reeepti V8 subject. 
The subsistent form. is lIholly self-eontaj ned, and remains so through all 
its operations_ If a form is received in a subject, it loses this quality ot 
self-comaimnent and is spread out through another principle to fom a 
composite being. 
thus St. Thomas turns the :i.maginative conception of the Nee-Platonic 
movement of a being back upon i tseU into an ontological explanation based on 
the mode of being of subsistent forms. 
Once the proposition hu been explained in this manner, we f!nd that it 
can be applied to God: It secundum hunc modum Deus max:1me ad essentiam su.am 
red! t, quia omnibus providens, ac per hoc quodammodo in omnia exiens et 
16Ibid• Ct. the parallel passage from ~. 1_, I, 14, 2 ad 1, p, 34" n. 13, 
above. 
17 or. pp. 26-27, above, for St. Thomas' paraphrase of the text and our 
analysis of the argument found in the commentary on the tex:t.. 
procendens .. in _ipso .f'ixua at :1mmixtu ~ •• 18 
We 'W'tll mow ahead now to consider st. 'l'hamaa' expl.am.tion ot .1£. 
lcnowlsd.ge 1n the fll'lge18 in De Venta., ~at1on F!1r:bt, Article S1x. Uera_ 
.... d Fl' . 
find fa treatment of the .... uni\lC'8al charaoter we found. in the approach to 
the qu_Uon ot God •• aelt-knowledge, the conclusion is an tlpplicat1ol'l of the 
prendaee to the pecullar ontolog1cal s:ttuation of the angels. 
!be ~ of the &rt1ole take. u ita point, of departure the d:i.ati::.otion 
bet1ll88n operat.ional transient operat1cm., Which ohange anotherJ and bDanent 
operations, wh.-1m 8l'e perfectiona in the agent. The a1m 11 to eol.. the 
d1tt1oul.ties proposed in tba third .net e.ightb op1n1onas against tbe poaaib1l1ty 
of _1t~ 1n the angels. 
Both of the_ difficulties are balled on the proposed principle that in 
knowledge the knowr and known are related u agent and pat1ent-I ? Since the 
same tb.tng _IMt be both agctnt mxt patient 1."1 an operation,. M ~1 cannot 
be a knOwing subject. graap1nt; itself' in &'1 sct of lmowlodge. .Perhaps with one 
part ot its being an angel can ~ to lmow aoot.htir ptWt, but tJle stated 
principle will excll'da knowledge or 631 Eu~~l t 8 l4bole being by 1 tselt • 
l8n. 'er., 2, 2 ad 2. The appl1caMon is not restr:lcted to God's knowl-
edge ~, but is made in a generalmallnm,- to f11a operations on all. 
creatu.ree. The appl1cl'ition ot the principle in the SUII'l!8 Theolofie-
empbui •• God's return in kllc'td.llg Himself. "Per se tlutem sam-:Fe max_ 
comenit Dec. Unde aecundum htulC modum loquendi ipse est maximo red1ena ad 
e •• mti.81 __ et cognoacens aeipaal'll. ft §.. I., I, llt.. 2 ad 1. 
lI-Praeterea, idem non poteflt ea. age.ns et patane, movena at motum, nisi 
hoc modo QUOd una pm'S eiue dt. mavens wl agens, et a11a mota wl paesaJ ut 
pa:tet in animal1bus, ut, probatur in VIII !aY!ieorum. f:ed 1nte~fm8 et 
1ntell.ectm .. babent ut &gen. et PfAtien8. &gO nonpotest ease ut angelus 
totum ., intel11ge.t ... --.B! V~X: •• 8, 6 arg. 3. 
The fint point. _de after the initial distinction of transient and 
i~nt operat.lona 18 t.&t operations of both k1nd8 require that the subject, 
muet be in act 1n the line 1n 'fIi'l1ch he oporat.... "Has autam d1.1a:8 actAOne8 in 
hoc coxmmlunt quod ultraque non progred1 tur n181 e.b exietente 1 n actu, 
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seowx!ta quod est .. ow. If 
The ,.xt point 1a the explanation at 1cnawledge .. an imJ:;anent ope.ratlon 
prooee41ng fIoJa t.be unton ot knowar and know. 
Actio aute. appet1 tus et eenaua e\ intel.l..ectus mD eat a10ut aot1o 
propoediens in ma1:.eriam exter!tJJ:'S, 8Od. siout actio consistene in lpao 
aa-nte, ut pertectlo ejueJ at ideo oportet quod lntellifPns" 
_cundum quod. i.ntell1g1t" 81t actuJ non ~uteM oporte\ quod. 
1ntelllgendo 1ntell1gene a1t ut agefl8, ~ntel1eetum ut p.u,sum. Sed 
inteUlgena et i.nt,ellect'UM, prout ex e18 est e£tectum unum quid, 
quod eat :hrt..el14ctus in acta, nnt 'Ull'ta pr1ncip:t:um buius actus qui 
est. inte1l:1gere.21 
Thus the k:nower 1s not alone the aGent, If.inee he i8 not in aet as a knower 
batore the union with the known object. Consequent on this union, the 
:tntellect 1n act-power completed by object-1s the single source of the act 
ot lmottl.ed.ge. 
The union ot knowr and known can be had 1n t.vo different W'I!J1'81 by the 
.aaenoe ot the known bei.ng joined to the knower or by a 11kene8s being so 
joined. Now 1.t can happen that action and passion MY be mCCt8Bal"Y to bring 
about t.he union of intellect and intelligible object. Thua 1n human knowledge 
the agent InteUcct 1"e000rs the i . .nteU1g1ble species actual:q knowable, and 
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the possible intellect is a patient in receiving the species. Hwe-ver this 
action and passion is not knowledge, but only the way to knowledge. 
The conclusion of this analysis is that knowledge follows on the union of 
intellect with something which is in act in the intelligible order. This is 
the second major principle which we will use in explanation of habitual self-
knowledge :1.n the human SOull "Intellectus intelligit omne illud quod est actu 
22 
intelligibile in eo." 
The rest of the exposition concerns the self-knowledge of an angel as 
following from the presence of its essence, w:hie..~ is in act in the intelligible 
order, to its intellect, which consequently knows this intelligible object to 
mich it is urdted. It will be instructive to us to follow the steps of the 
argument to see the way st. Thomas works out a comparison between the angel 
and the human possible intellect. 
'!'he first step is an explanation of how thi.ngs exist in the intelligible 
order. The second step is an expl.anation of operation in the intelligible 
order. In both parts st. Thomas draw the explic1 t paral.lel between this 
treatment of the intelligible order and the aspects of the entati'Ve order 
which would be more gener~ known to his reader. The first part gives the 
grades of intelligible being, trlS second, the modes of intelligible 
operation. 
1) Sciendum est igitur, quod nihil prohibet esse Illiquid 
actu unum et in potentia alterum ••• .; et similiter est 
possibi1e aliquid esse actu ens, quod in genera intell1g1-
billum est potentia tantum. Sicut enim est gradus actus at 
potentiu in entibus, quod aliqt.dd eat potentia tantU1l, ut 
materia prlma; aliquid 8C\U tantum, ut Deus; all.quid sow 
., potentia u\ omnia 1ntermediaJ sic eat in genere inteUigi-
b1li_ allquid ut actu tantum, ee1licet esamtia d1v1naJ 
aliquid ut potentia tantum, ut intellectus possib1.lis •••• 
OXl'lrlns autem substantiae angellou aunt mediae, habente. 
aliquid de potentia e\ aetu, non solum in genere ent1un, eed 
etiam :tn ge:nere 5.nt.el.ligibilium. 
2) Siout 19itur materia prima non pot,est agere al1quam 
aot1onam nili pertlciatur per f'Omatl, (it tunc actio Ula est 
queedam emanat10 tOl"lnU ipsiUIIJ magi. quam materiae. rea autea 
exi8tAmte. aatu poar:\U'lt agere actionem aeeunc.tum quod fJWlt 
actuJ ita intellectus po •• ibilla noster nihil poteet intel-
ligere anteqUllll pert;. aiatur forma intellig1b1l1 in &otu. 
Tunc enhl 1ntell1g1 t z-. cu1us est illa torma, nee poteat _ 
intelligere mill! per fonnam intelligib1lem actu in .. 
extate!1tem. IntelJ.ect.ua vero angeli, quia habet eamtian 
quae oat ut actus in genere intelligibUium., sibi p:raeaentaa,. 
poteet inteU1gere 1d quod est intelllgibile apud 1.paun, 
IJC1licet es.ntism sue, non ~r aliquam sim1litud1nefl'l, ae4 
per ••• nt1an.23 
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The erueial point in the first part of the explanation is that the 
angela a.re in act (though not in ptU"8 act) in U18 intelligible order. The 
second mowment of explanation brlngs us to the eonclli8ion that an ~ 
know8 itsel.t" since its own easenee 1. in act. jn the :1ntell1g1ble order and 
natural.l.;v united with its 1ntelleet. 'thus our second prlnc'.ple governing 
krXni1edge is applied perfectly ~o the ea_ of angelic selt-knowledge.-a be1ll 
lunderstand.ing 'l;.het 'Ii1jeh ie wn.ted with lt.e intellect and in act in the 
intelligible order. 
We also haft a further explanation Which shows why there 1. no continual 
aelf-knowlcxlge in the hu.man soul. The reason i:l in the r't3ture ot tJle possible 
23Ib14• ct. Chart I, p. 39, for a acbemati.c treatment of the oompar180ruI 
made int:'bIs passage. 
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CHART I 
SCHEMATIC ANALYSIS or ANGELIC SEI:F-KNOWLEDGE 
IN !! _VE .... :lU .... .;.;;TA .. TEiiiiiiJ, Q. 8, A. 6 
I. Comparison ot orders B;cco,rdirys .:!2 beipB: 
Entat1 ve Order 
1. God (actu tantum) 
_..;;.;.0., ............ 
2. Prime Matter 
C{!2tent1a tantum) 
). All intermediate 
existing thinge (.!2!! !! E2tent1a) 
I Intelligible Order 
t 1. Divine Essence (actu tantum) 
----
I 2. Peen ble Intellect 
Cp!tent:1a tantum) 
, .3. Angelic Substances 
(habentes aliquid 
.2! e>tentia !! ~ 
n. Comparison of orders aecordi15 .!e wration, 
Entatift Order 
1. Pr1me Matter-
a. can act only when 
perfected bY' torm. 
b, action is of the 
tom more than of 
the matter. 
2. Beings in act-
can act in the line 
in which they are in 
aot. 
I Intelligible Order 
I 1. Possible Intellect-
a, can understand onq when 
perfected by intelligible 
tora. 
b. understanding is of the 
natural subject ot the 
form; $" f -knowledge is 
consequent and seoondar,y. 
I 2. .Angelic inte Uec\-
understands that wIlich is in 
aot and united wi th itself, 
i.e., its own es.nee. 
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intellect: it is bereft of an intelligible object until the agent. intellect 
performs its :tunction of abstraction and illumination on a phanta.8m. We will 
work out the consequences ot this nee.ssi ty in the next chapter in handling 
the causes of the habitual knowledge the buman soul. has of itselt. 
In response to the fifth opinion opposing the possibUity ot self-
knowledge in the angel we see our first governing principle brought into 
action. 
The major premise of the argument in the opinion is exactly the principle 
we found operatiw in explaining the necessity of God having knowledge of 
Himself, "Nihil intelligi tur nisi secuncb.:a quod denudatur a materia et a 
conditionibu8 material1bus. ft24 The minor premise proposes that being-in-
potency is a material condition from which one can never separate the angelic 
essence and therefore this essence is not knowable. 
The anawr is that the material conditions 'Which prevent knowledge are 
those which restrict natural forms to determined material dimensions. Thus 
there is no need for separating an angel £rom the poten.cy- found in it, since 
it is not the potency of a determined and extended material object.2S The 
implied conclusion is the correct applioation of the first governing principle 
of knowledge: since the angelic essence is comp1etel1' immaterial, it 18 of 
24 Ibid., arg. S. 
-
2$ Ibid.., ad. S. 
-
26 
:ttselt knowable. 
By way of conclusion to this chapter let us brietly' review the two 
governing principles of knowledge derived from st. Thomas' expositions of 
divine and angelic self-knowledge. 
The first principle is that both the power to know ar.d the capacity to be 
known require ilaateriality. Here is the statement of the disposition or mode 
of being required before knowledge can take place. As we saw, the source of 
this principle was tJle consideration of knowledge as the way in which some. 
beings can as.imUate greater perfection. That this aS8imilation take place, 
it i8 absolutely necessary that it take place immaterially, or the tbole 
meaning of knowledge as of "the other" is denied. 
'!he second principle was that a knower understands whatever i8 actual.ly 
knowable, and united with his intellect. This describes the effect of 
immateriality, actual knowability'J and the relation which subject and object 
must have: identity, t.hrough essence or speeies. 
We Will turn now to work out a full explanat:ton of the habitual knowledge 
the human soul hal of itself, keeping these two governing principle. in view. 
2~u. st. Thomas also explains in the course of treating the knowledge 
an angel has ot another angel. The context is a reference to their self'-
knowledge: ttTunc enim non oportet quod sit aliud forma in intellectu, et 
foma qua res in se subsisU t J eo quod ipsa forma qua talls res in H 
SUbsistit! est intelligibilis in actu propter immunitatem suam a materia." 
De Ver., 6, 1 c .. 
--
CRAPI'ER IV 
IN mE DE VERITATE 
-----
The a1m of this chapter is to reach an exact understanding of the 
paragraph in the De Veritate in which st. Thomas describes the hu:ma.n soul's 
-
hnbi tual knowledge ot itself. 
Our first consideration is to determine the exaot S'llbject ot discussion in 
the article. What is to be unierstood by the tem mens? The lilole ot the 
- 1 tenth question ot the B!. Veritate 1s concerned with this subjeot and we can 
find the detini tion we seek in the first article of the question. 
The nominal origin of the word mens regarding the human soul is the tact 
-
tha.t the soul has a mansura within itself in first principles. In knowing, the 
soul can be said to measure things by these principles. 2 The tact is that 
these principles are implicitly operative in every jUdgment.' Thus,!!!!. has tc 
do with the intellectual faculty. 
st. Th01l'/8.8 .further explains that whenever the name of a power comes to be 
lThe title« "De Mente, In Qua Est Imago Trinitatis." 
2"Nomen mentis hoc dioitur in anima" siout at intellectus. Solum enb1 
intellectu8 aceipit cogntt1onem de rebus mensurando eas quasi ad sua 
principia." De Ver., 10, 1 c. 
--
3"Aliqua naturaliter eognosc1mus ut per se nota, ad quae omnia alia 
examin.am.us secundum sa de omnibus judieantes." Ibid., 10, 8 o. 
-
used tor the subject of that power, the name is alway. taken from the highest 
power of the thing in question.4 
The conclusion ot the article is tr..at mens either denotes the highest 
-
power of the soul, or it is used regarding the eS8el108 ot the soul, and then i 
denotes the eseenee preoisely aa the aou.rce ot the highest powere' 
In answering the various argumnts proposed in the question, st. Thomas 
makes some further precialona of the meaning of mens. In answer to the second 
-
argument be shoW'll that mens includes more than just the intelleot. He calls 
-
it rtquoddam genua potentiarum, ut sub mente intell1gantur comprebendt OmDeS 
ill.ae potent1ae quae in suia aotlbus omnino a materia et eondi tionibus 
materiae recedunt."6 The reason for this inclusion of the will is that it en-
joys the S811le dignity and supremacy among the soults powers as the intellect 
s:lnce both have equally universal objects. St. Thomas again adds that the 
name mens can also ref"er to the soul precisely as the source ot the.. two 
-
It we now turn to the introductory paragraphs ot !!!. Veritate, 10, 8, we 
can determine exactly how mens is used in thia article. The first step in 
-
4nEt ideo si aliqua. res per suam potentlam debeat designari, oportet quod 
designatur per ultimum potent1ae suae.lt Ibid., 10, 1 c. 
-
SUEt sic mens, prout in ea est imago, nom:1na.t potentiam animae et non 
essentiamj vel s1 nominat essentiam, hoc 8at nisi inquantll1l ab ea nul t tali. 
potentia." ~. 
6xb1d., ad 2. In arunrer to the ninth opinion mens is further explained 
as a general power of the soul having di..f.'ferent powers-as its parts. 
7 Ibid., ad 8. 
-
St. Thomas' exposition is to cl.ari1'y the meaning of ~ essenti~ in the 
question posed at the head of the article: "utrum mens seipsam per essentiam 
cognoscat an per aliquam speci_." 
Per eSlent1am suam does not refer to the object of knowledge, as it the 
-- -
question were whether we know the essence or only the accidents of the soul. 
The present question refers to the mediUDl ot our knowledge ot the soul. What 
is partieularll' significant is the way St. Thomas at least nominalJ¥ bypasses 
the question regarding mena and takes the soul (anima) as the subject ot the 
-
whole discussion. 
Al10 modo ut referatur ad id quo eognosciturJ et siC intelligitur 
aliquid per essentiam cognosci, quia ipsa essentia est quo 
cognoscitur. Et hoc modo ad praesens quaeritur, utrum anima per 
essentiam inteUigat se. 
Ad cuius rei evidentiam, notandum est, quod de anima duplex 
eognitio ,beri poteet ab unoquoque, ut Augustinus dicit in ix!!!. 
Tr1n1tate. 
Thus we can conclude hom the substitution ot anima that the subject of 
the article il the soul itsel.f. The precise intention would seem to be to 
the second way in which mens was explained in the first article in this tenth 
-
question. Thus, we are dea.l.iftg with the 80ul as the source, or ontolOgical 
subject, trom which the powers of intellect and. will proceed. 
The next point in our approach to the article is to point out the Wo 
types ot knowledge of the soul that are possible. The distinction is betwen 
knowing the nature ot the soul and knowing its ex5.stence, as we saw in the 
8 Ibid., 10, 8, c. Italics added. Anma is used through the body ot the 
article, With two exceptions, until the conclusion. 
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Co:mmentarr .2!! ~ sentences: 9 
Duplex cognitio haberi 110test ab unoquoque, ut Augustinus dicit in 
ix ~ Trinitate. Una. quidem, qua uniuscuiusque anima se tantum 
cognosei t quantum ad id quod est ei proprium; et alia qua. 
cognoscj,tur anima quantum ad id quod ow,bus animabus est commune. 
Illa enim cognitio quaa commtmiter de omni anima he.betur, est 
quo cognoscitur animas natura; eogn5tio vero quam quis ha.bet de 
anima quantum ad id quod est sibi proprium, est cognitio de anima 
secundum quod habet esse in ta~i indjviduo. Unde per bane 
cognitionem cognoscitur an est Mima, sicut cum aliquis perc:l.pit Be 
habere a.nilntIm; per alima varo cognitionem scitur quid est anima., at 
quae sunt per se accidentia eius.10 
The last named approach is expL,:lined :i.n the second half of the exposition 
as based on a dis curs i ve reasoning process proceeding from the objects of the 
soul's operative powers. 'l'ms proceeds the philosophical investigation which 
ends in knowledge of the conlmon nature and properties of the soul. st. Thomas 
repeats the compf.rison of the intellect w.ith prime matter to indicate why such 
11 
a discursive process is necessary. Just as prime matter is only known 
through our knowledge of form, so the intellectual power is known through the 
perfections of other beings received in knowledge.12 
The second way of knowing the s. ul is for an individual to come to know 
t.b.at he has a soul: ttsicut cum nliquis percipit BEl he.b€~re animam." This 
knowledge is then shown to take place at two levels: that of actual knowledge 
9In III Sent., 23, 1, 2 sol. Cf. pp. 1[1-21 above. 
- -
lone Var., 10, 8 c. 
--
12 De Ver., 10, 8 c. 
--
46 
and that of hab:ltual knowledge. For the purpose of easily dlstjnguishing the 
rea.soned knowledge of the soults nature and the perceived knowledge of the 
soul's existence, we 1611 use the term. "understanding" to denote t.lJe former 
and "awnreness" to denote the latter. This usage is roughly equivalent to 
tllilt of illtelli&E;re and eercipere :i.n the text of St. Tb.omas. 
St. Thomas then explains that this a'Vlareness, ~:t the level of actual 
knowledge, does not require a discursive process, but is had directly and 
without a logical mediunl. I t occurs in the awareness of t.he soul's activities 
which is concondtant with the activities themselves. The implication is that 
in our operatlons we are aware tht;',t we do operate and this awareness involves 
awareness of the soul wh:l.ch :1.8 operating. Thus,:in the first part of his 
fourfold an8'Her to the question posed in the article, st. Thomas says that 
actual aWSJ."eness of the soul is had through the operations of the soul: 
Quantum igitur ad actualem cognitionem, qua al1quis considerat se 
in actu animam habere, sic dico, quod anjm.a cognosc:ttur per actus 
sues. In hoc enirn al:lquis perc:i.pit se anim.am habere, et vivere, et 
esse, quod perc5.pit se sent ire et :tr.telllgere, et alia huiusmodi 
vitae opera exercere.13 
A striking contrast between the t;Yl'es of knowledGe of the soul-wawareness 
and understanding--is the absolute certainty of one t s awareness of the 
existence of his soul comp:n:-ed with the diffj.culty of understanding the nature 
13Ibic1• 
-
47 
of the soul. 14 
From this comparison we can learn something about the content of our 
awareness of the soulls existence. :,je can put t..ne question in th:ls fasMon: 
What is affirmed a.s ex1.st:1.ng in the judgment which results fran this actual 
awareness? The subject of the affirmation cannot be understood to be the 
It form of the body," or II some i.m.mater:tal principle. ft These aspects of the soul 
are known only in understandj.ng the nature ot the soul and are gained through 
the process of discursive jnvsstigation. 
In the text :5. t was stated thElt this awareness of the soul is involved :in 
the awareness that one is acting :i.n a part:i.eular way. The awareness of the 
soul is then an implication, though an implication about wh1ch we haw 
complete certainty. It follows thpt, just a,s one comes to aff:5rm, ttl know 
this thing; I sense th2.t thing I live,'t from the awareness of hi.s acts, so one 
would come to affj.I'm, "'!'here is in :me the source of knoldng, the souree of 
sensing, and the source of life. If The latter is implied, and it :lndicates the 
soul in a vague and general manner. v-!e must r:i.gorously exclude from the 
notion of this source any content 'beyond a most primitive idea of someth:ing 
t<lhieh operates. It cannot be specH'ied as wb.olly :1der..tical with the ~rsonJ 
Jli.ftSecundum hoc scient:i-a de an:i.Ina est certissima., quod unusquisque in 
seipso experitur se animrun hahere, et actus animae si.b1 inesse; sed eogno8cere 
quid sit .anima difficillimum est." Ibid., ad 8 in contr. Also: " Nullu8 
erravit unquam i,n hoc quod non pereiperet se vivere, quod pertinet ad 
cognitionem qua aliquis percipit quid in anima qua agatur; secundum quam 
cognitionem dictum est quod anima. per essentiam suam cognoscitur in habitu." 
Ibid., ad 2. 
-
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or u being e. d.1..stinct part ot hiflh Nothing of its nature or properties can 
be attimed; all that. ,. make 1s an affirmation :In all certainty tluit tilis 
source does ex1st.15 The ground of the e.i'firmntion :i.e the actual perception 
of th5.s source operati.ng in some deflnite way. We mtght add that the way in 
'Which ... most. coamonly meet. this e}~enoo is in the certainty we haw, 
consequent on our acts, thst some act of our did take place. hhat St. Tho!'a&s 
is pcdnt5ng out is that the perception ot "me operating*' is in rea.l1t:r a. per-
oepti-on of the soul operating, eventhourJl a man cannot formulate the 
ol.1talof;icnl :relationship at suppoa1t, tormnl principle, anti operative ~r in 
the human operations which he daiq perfoms. 
W. can tur11 to the aecencl type of awa:reness or the soul's existence. 
Sed quantUDl ad cognitiotel hab1tualem, 8j,c dice, quod an:tma per 
essentiam suam Be v.tdet, id est ex hoc ipso quod assentia sua est 
sib:1, praeeens, eat p::>tena ox1re in actun cogflitionis sui ipaiWlJ 
siout aliquis ex hoc q\1od bnbet eliCltlus 8cdentiee habitum., ex 
ipsa. prae_nM.a habitus, eat poterus percipere illa quae 8ubfmnt 
illi hab1tu1. Ad 1100 aute.m quod perc:lpi.at a."1ima se *,81!1O, et quid 
in seip ... agat.ur attendat, non requ1r1t\1r aliqlds habitus; sed ad. 
hQc auf't1cit sola essentia animae, qUM ment1 est. prafU:M)t18, ex ea 
en1ln a~8 progred:1untur, jn quibua actual1ter ipsa percjpitur.16 
Tbe fb-et thing to 1:e pointed out in the paragraph is that tw relation-
ships am established. First the notion of habitual eeU-awarel185. is 
1$1n thls explanat::lon of actual aelt-aWl"'E'tt1eS8 of the soul, we haw 
tollawed J. Fegha1re, C.S .Sp., !ntellectus at IktM.o solon saint Thomas d t,Aguin (lWis-Ottawa, 1936), pp. 2Oh .. ~. b -., , •• - -
16ne Vcr., 10, 8 c. 
--
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developed by the phrase "essentia animae est sibi praesens." Secondly, this 
state of 'be:1.ng present to itself constitutes the power the soul has to come to 
be actual1\v aware of itself.' j n the Inal'lIlflr deseribd above. Thus two 
equ1 valences are made: 
1) CoSJ}itio habitual1~ 
2) Essentja al1imae 
~ praesens 
• 
• 
Essentia a.nimae 
~ praesens 
Potentia ut anima. 
!!. ~ cogroscat 
In the fj.rst equivalence we see that habitual self-knowledge is a disposition 
of the soul, a pertjcular mode of be:1ng. In the second, it :1.s stated that 
this disposition or state of the soul rr.a.kes the soul capable of se1f-
awareness in its operations. 
We will take up t.,hree approaches to t.he passage to gain a full under-
standing of what exactly this disposition of the soul is. First, we will 
examine the import of' the comparison vlith an intellectual hf?bit. Secondly, 
we will apply the general princ:l.ples on knowledge to the human soul to see 
how the state of self.'-presence merits the name of knowledge. Thirdly, we will 
work out an analysis of the explan.~.tory f:tnal sentence in the para.graph. 
First, to the question of intellectual habits. Habits, generall.y speak-
ing, are qualitative modifications of human powers which incline the power to 
specific acts.17 In the intellectual povrer, a habi.t is a disposition of the 
possible intellect to know a particular thing. Intellectual habits are 
constituted by retained intelligible spec:i.es which become more or less 
17 1!! n ~., 24, 1, 1 501. and ~.1., I-II, 54, 1 c. 
SO 
permanent modifications of the possible intellect.18 The intellect with 
retained knowledge stands mid-way between the :i.n! tiaJ. state of no determinatio 
19 
and the state of actual knowledge. 
The general result of the oomparj_son is clear. The state of the soul--
being present to it.self--est8blishes a disposition wid eh inclims the sou1 to 
know it.self as acttng Wtlenever it does act. 'The state does not immediately 
cause actual knowledge.20 Still, there is :rIO spec:l.es whl.ch sets up this 
. 21 disposition; but Ule essence of the soul alone br-..lngs the state about.. 
The conclusion trot develops is that there is a definite parity between 
the relation of the reted ned specj.es to the possible intellect and the 
relat:lon of the essence of the soul to the intelleot. Both are dispositions 
18nSpec:les intelligibilcs In intelleotu possi.bili remanent post actua1em 
cons:i_derationem, at herr-urn ordinatio est habitus scientiae. fI De Ver., 10, 2 c. 
--
20rhus we have Emother point of similarity between an intellectual habit 
and the power for awareness of the soul; just as selt-awareness is had only in 
operations of knowing another thing, so a habit is actuated only when the 
agent intellect illuminates a 'propor:l1antasm. "Cum phantasmata sa habent hoc 
modo ad intellectum possib:t1em sicut sens:ibil:l.a ad sensum, ••• quantumcumque 
aliquam speciem inte1l1giMlsl7l apud se habeat, nunqmllll truoon actu aliquid 
considerat secundum ilium speciem, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.n De 
Ver., 10, 2 ad 7. -
-
21uIntellactus noster nihil e.ctu poteat intelllgere antequam a 
phantamnatibus abstrahat; nee etiam pertest habere habitualem notitimn aJ.iorum. 
a ee, quae scilicet in ipso non aunt, ante abstractionem praedictarn, eo quod 
species e.l.iorum 1ntelligibilium non aunt e1 innatae. Sed essentia. sua. sibi 
innata est; ut non eam necesse habeat a phantasmatibus aequirere; ••• at 
ideo mens antequam t'. phantamnatibus a.batrahat, sui notitism habitu.alem habet, 
qua. possit percipere Be esse." De Ver., 10, 6 ad 1. 
--
for particular kinds of knowledf,'8: the species for knO"W'ledge of "What it 
represents, and the essence of the soul for knowledge of the soul's existence, 
or as we were led to develop the point, for certain knowledge that there is in 
the lmo-wer a principle of a determ:lned kind of act. 
In moving to the second part of our explanation, we ask how this disposi-
tion of the soul can be called knowledge.' As we take up this point, it is 
well to recall the frrune of reference within which we are m.oving in dealing 
with human knowledge. The central. point is what we spoke of earlier as the 
orientation of the human knowing power to grasp its object throUP..h What it 
finds in phantasms. The point is of such ca.pital importance in st. Thomas' 
work that we are sureq pointing to a defini t.e part of the intellect.ual 
atmosphere SUlTound.i.ng the writing of this passage, by recalling it here. 
We turn now to the question of how st. Thomas comes to call the soul's 
essential state a kind of knowledge. Our f:lrst gowrning principle of 
knowledge is the proporMonallty between freedom :fro1il matter and knowledge. 
Since it is established that the human soul is independent from matter, it is 
demonstrated that the soul is graced with the power to know-it has a faculty' 
of intellect.22 A second conclusion would be that the soul is of itself 
knowable, though of course not actually known since not reached through a 
22It is to be noted that our procedure here is a do'WllWt'..rd movement ot 
demonstration through causes. We a.ssume the temporally prior movement of 
invention :trom percej:ved effects. 
phantasm. 2.3 
The second governing principle of knowledge is that know.tng follows on 
the union of :i.nteUect with a thing 'Which is in act in the intelligible order. 
What then do we have in the human soul? There is surely no aboriginal. union 
of intellect With something completely other than itself. But there is a 
constant union of intellect w:tth the soul, and this union is established and 
preserved by the soul being the ontologicaJ. subject from Which flows the 
intellectual power. 24 This then is the relation signified in saying that the 
soul is present to itself. 25 The fact we face is that in the mind of St. 
2lrhus the soul is classed with those th:tngs Wh1.ch st. Thomas calls 
"intelligibiles per seipsasJ unde aunt magis nota.e secundum naturam, quamvis 
minus nota.e nobis. 1t De Ver., 2" 2 c. Thus we come to agree with the 
contention of Fr. GardeiI"'tb.at the reason for no continual awareness of the 
soul is wholly from the necessary ll'IOde~f operat:i,on of the soul as .(he subject 
o£~owledge. Cf."La perceptlon experimentale de ltame par eUe-melIne," 
l1elanges Thomistes (Kain, 192.3), p. 224. 
24n1ta atiam non oportet quod semper intelligatur actualiter ipsa mens. 
cuius cognitio Ioost nobis habitualiter, ex: hoc quod ipsa eius assentia 
intellectui nostro est praesens." De Ver., 10., 8 a.d 11. Italics added. On 
the reciprocai relation: "intellecnviPotentia est fonna ipsius animae 
quantum ad actum essendi; eo q:uod haoot esse in aninl8., • • .sed quantum ad 
actum intelligendi. nihil prohioot esse e converso.tt Ibid., ad 1.3. 
-
2~In con.:firmation: "illud propria dicitur praesens cuius essentia 
intellectui vel senaui presentatur." In III Sent., 24, 1, 2 ad 4. It is here 
that we have a satisfying explanation or the Ne~Platonic notion ot the soul 
as substantially "bent back" on itself. The first "movement" is the emanation 
of intellect from the essence of the soul. The "return" is the relation of 
this intellect to the essence ronaidered as object of habitual knowledge. 
Since both "movementsff are wholly in the spiritual realm, with no intermediate 
organ, the return is well termed,· "subsistentia rei in seipsG."tt in De Ver., 2, 
--2 ad 2. 
5) 
Thomas the ontologica.l relationship ot essence to power in the human soul 
consti tuted a kind ot knowledge. For him it was knowledge just as it is 
knowledge when a species remains habitually :in the intellect and disposes it 
to know whrt the species represents. 
Thus the presence of the BOul to i tselt :i.8 actually the presence of the 
essence of the soul to its own intellect. A.s presence of an intelligible 
(because immaterial) being it is called knowledge. As presence to its own 
int.ellect it is called self-knowledge. Finally, as presence of the principle 
of human operations it is alone the ground of the awareness which the soul has 
of itself' in t,hose operations. This third point we w::i.ll expand in ~zing 
the final sentence of tille paragraph on hab:Ltual selt-knowledge. 
A.d hoc autem quod percipiat a.nima sa esse I et quid in seipsa agatur 
attendat, non requ:1ritur aliquis habj.tus; sed ad hoc 8ufficit sola 
essentia an:i.mae qu.n.e menM. est praesens, ex ea enim actus 
progrediuntur, in qui bus actualiter ipsa percipitur. 26 
The heart of the statement is that the essence of the soul suff:i.ces for 
awnreness of the soul to take place. This essence is again described as menti 
Eaesens.27 As present in this way it grounds awareness of operations (9..uid 
!!l seipsa aetur), as well as ·alilaren.ess of its own existence (Sluod :e,ercilP!t 
anima se esse). 
--
26Ibid., 10, 8 e. 
-
27 Again the relation of intellect (mens here) to essence as to the object 
-of habitual knowledge is underscored. 
!he reason that the soul 80 grounds its self'-awarenes is that in its 
essence it 1s a sour ca or the acts percei ved--:!! !!. ~ B;ctu,s l!£9l£!d1untur. 
!he acts of the powers are rooted in the soul as in their fo:rma.l principle. 
Thus we can point out a pertect parallel ot being with operatjon: in the line 
of being, the essenee of the soul is the subject from which the acts proceed 
through the various powers; in the line of opere,tion, the awareness that is 
had of the soul is precisely that of an existing subject per.forming de.fWte 
operations. 
Thus we come to formulate our explanation of habitual scl.f-l.mowledge in 
the human soul as the relationship, fourKi :1n the soul in first act, of tm 
intellectual power to the essence of the soul, not merely as to the S')1.11'ce 
from which it emanates, but to a knowable thing immediately present. 
A dewloped understanding of that situation in the constitution of the 
human soul can come from comParison with the state ot self-understanding in 
an angel, where the intellectual power has an immediate grasp of the angelic 
essence in actual knowledge.28 In man, the result is not imr:lediate actual 
selt-unierstanding, since all such 'U.l'lderstanding follows the operat:ton ot 
a.gent intellect on a phantasm. The result in man, howver, is not a purely 
potential state of kI'lOllledge. It is the mediate and developed state of 
habitual retention of its essence-of a disposition inclining the human 
280r• pp. 37-38, above. 
intellect to actual s.U.....arene •• in the operations grounded in the soul. 
In conclwdon 1:0 this chapter, let us reter brieny to the concluding 
p8J'f1gr&pbs in our study ot th1.1 doctr:1rla in the ~ ~ !!! Sentencea.29 
The t1rat obae!"'fttion to be _de is that \18 haw _en a striking example 
of the Mind of st. Thomas in develoJDOnt. We moved with h1m from ecattqred 
s"~. on the topic of human aeltwknovledge tbrougb the tormul.ation of 
pneral principles and on to a eyetemat:1o 1il"eatment in whlch the problem is 
di'91ded and. aucc1nctlJ" explained in each of its parts according to the guiding 
pr1ncjPlea.JO 'lb.e explanation ill cl.ear~ thought out by way of cau8&l 
relationahipa and in our tm.al,yais .. found the reasons driftn back to tJle 
ontolof~cal structure of the being in question. 
Secondly, we can .t.i.niBh by giving an8'tfOr8 to the ditficul tic. that were 
remaitrl.ng at the end of our study of the ~lentarz.2E.!h!. ~ntence.. 1) 
Habitual. selt-knowledge is partial.l¥ equivalent with the jmmateriallty of the 
soul, s:ine8 1mater1allty makes the soul a knower-a habitual knower regarding 
it. own existence. 2} Ilmoodiate refl.6ct.1on ia the actuation of habitual 
29 Ct. PP. 2,-26, abo_. 
lOw. would aaait that t.he govern:1ng prinCiples of knowledge were tormu-
ls.ted and were O]:)fll"'fltive 1.n the work of Ht. 'lhomaa long before the diapu.tat1cn 
de writate. Ho.wr 11'. ie indicative of bls ontolog1oal approach to the ma~.n p;.;,mma 0' knowledge that the prinCiples preceded tbe 8yst.emet:ie explanation 
of the posa1b111t3' and operations of ht.sman unde",tand.ing. Thus., feel _ 
be"" e&Ut;.,t an autJlent1c part of St. 'ihC!'m88 t developnent :In this t..beais, e'ftm 
though. the texts ,. are deallng with are tom:u.lat:1oM ot ear11er 5.ntaUectual. 
labora. 
knowledge, because this refiection is equivalent with actual _l:t .... vareness 
experienced in human operationa. 3) There is knowledge that a th:ing is, apart 
from knowledge of its quiddity, since that is what occurs in our awareness of 
our own soul. 4) Self-presence and the substantial return in the human soul 
are completely explained bY' our understanding that habitual. sel.t-knowledge 
expresses the relation of intellect to its ontological source--the soul--1n 
man who must gain actual knowledge through phantasms. 
CHAPTER V 
HABITUAL SELF-KIDWLE:DGE Ttl THE 
LATER \-JORKS OF ST. THOMAS 
We can conclude the work o:f this thesis by considering St. Thomas' later 
treatment of man's knowledee of his own soul. In turn we will take up three 
texts: first, a chapter in the Sumrr..a Contra Gentiles$ secondly; an article in , 
the Summa. TheoloGiae; and thirdly, the commentary on the f'::lfteenth proposition 
ot the Li'ber ~ Caus1.s. Our purpose in stUdying these texts is to search out 
aI\Y :f'urther developnent in the notion of the soul t s habitual knowledge ot 
itself. 
In the Summa. Contra Gentiles, the soul's reflective knovledge ot itself 
is torma.lly trea.tedl as a part of the long discussion ot the end ot man in the 
.first sixty-three chapters of. Book Tt'...ree. The immediate context is at. 
Thomas' rejection of' the possi.billty ot man comj ng to know God through 
knowledge ot the separated intellectual substances. In turn, he rejects the 
different variations on t.1-tis doctrine as proposed by Avempa.ce (ell. 41), by 
Alexander of Aphrodisias (oh. 42), and by J~verroes (ch. k3). Then st. Thomas 
shows that the ultimate happiness tor man cannot be in such knowledge ot the 
separated substances (ell. 44). Then he lays down the genera.l solution that in 
le. 0., nI, 46. The title: "Quod anima in hac vita non intelligat 
seipsam.. It 
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this lite we can have no understanding of the separated substance. since they 
exceed the scope of the human intellect (00. 45). 
At the beginning of the next chapter, st. Thomas recognizes that certain 
words of st. Augustine seem to propose a difficulty in this matter. Augustine 
is quoted, "'Mens, siout oorporearum rerwn notitias per sensus corporis 
colligit, sic incorporea.rum rerum per aemetiPsum • .,2 st. Augustine has alao 
said that the soul knows itself "per seipsam." Thus one could argue that the 
soul knows itself directly and thus comes to 'lmderstar.d the incorporeal 
separated substances. 
st. Thomas then proceeds to sol 'is the apparent difficulty. The 'boc:9' of 
the article can be outlimd as having three parts: first .. arguments against 
direct understanding of the human soul (~ ~) J secondly, the distinction 
based on Aristotle between awareness (quod.2.!.:) of the soul and understand1ng 
(~ !..!!) J and third:Qr, a oorrelation of the knowledge had of the soul with 
the knowledge had in this life of the sepsrated aubstanoes. 
lie have already touched on the JliB.tter of the first part in our study of 
the Commentarz .2!! 2 Sentences,.3 and the matter of the third ~ ia outside 
the scope of this thesis. Therefore we w:ill review o~ the two paragraphs 
(beginning ~ Aristoteles and ~ ig;!.tur) where st. Thomas makes the fam1l1ar 
distinction between understanding and awareness of the human soul and the re-
specti'Ve methods to these two kinds of knowledge. 
Jet. above, pp. 14-18. 
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At the end of the .first section of the chapter, st. Thomas haa shown that 
Augustine really agrees with him in denying that the soul can understencl 
itself directly. \-Je will take up the second seetj,on of the chapter in tour 
parts. 
First, Aristotle cert&inly denies direct seU-knowledge in the soul. The 
possible intellect knows itself in the same manner as it knows other things-
through the intellig:i.ble species which bring it into act 1.n the intelligible 
order.1t. 
Secondly, St. Thomas i.mmediatel.y shows the reason tor Aristotle's 
position; considered in ltself, the possible jr·tellect is in potency in the 
intelligible order. Consequently, 11; :1s through the act (!!!E!2. intelliere) 
of the intellect that its nature is man11'ested to itself. 
'lhirdl\r, as a consequence, it must be that Augustine meant that we have 
direct knowledge of the soul in the sense of awareness of its existence. 
Fourthly, in a very brief explanation st. Thomas shows that this awarenes 
is not a matter o.f demonstration with the species or the act used as a logical 
medium. Rather it is a dlrect perception in the operation ot the soul: "ex 
hoc enim ipso quod percipit se agere, perciplt sa esse. Agit autem per 
seipsam. Uncle per seipsa.nl de Be cogn08ci t quod est. fl 5 
4"Intellectu8 poss:lbilis intelligit Be sicut at alia. Intelligit erdm 
per apeciem 1,ntelligib1lem qua tit actu in genere intelligibil1um.." 0.0., 
nl, 46 (in mad.). --
'Ibid _. 
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There are three obseM'ations to 'te made on this pa8sage. First, it is 
clear th~t behind the natural flow of quotations, explanations, and arguments 
in the passage J there lies the same doctrinal. outline which we saw in the 
Cammenta17 sm the Sentences and in the l!. Vert tate. 6 There are two ways .. 
know the soul and the reason for this is in the natval. orientation of the 
human intellect to understand what it finds represented in phantasms. The 
subject is not treated in further detail and 80 no mention is made of self'-
knowledge as 6 habitual disposition of the soul. The chapter thus adds 
nothing directq to our understanding of the central passage we are treating 
in this thnis. 
Secondly, the awareness of the soul 1s proposed as a fact. In this sense 
the probl.ematic words of St. Augustine are true-here the soul has direct 
(E!!. •• i.psam) knowledge ot itself. Our observation is that tor st. Thomas 
simply to point out this kind of knowledge as a fact is sufficient jn this 
context. The fact is enough to saft the authority of St. Augustine. It would 
be pursu:1ng a tangent to elaborate on habitual selt-knowledge as the disposition 
underlying this .,. of knowing the soul. 
1'b.1rdlJ, a discussion ot habitual self-kllOWled.ge Wl:>uld haft impeded. 
St. Thomas in carrying out the purpose of this chapter. Mention of this 
6 This is especially true in the concluding summary of the chapters 
"Siout autem de an1ma scimus quia est per seipsam, in quantum ejus actus 
percipimusJ quid autem sit inquir:1mus ex actibus at objectls per principia 
scientiarum speculativaruaJ ita etia de his quae sunt in anima nostra. 
8clliclt potentli. et habitibus, sc:imus quidem quia sunt, in quantum actus 
~rcip:1mus. Quld vera mnt, ex lpsorum qualitate inveniJnus." Ibld., (ad 
fin.). -
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knowledge which, :i.n the ordinary sense, is net knowledge would have further 
complicated the remo'Val of the difficulty which made the chapter necessar,y. 
N~ at least, more wou1d be granted to the opposition, and then a 
.turtber expL'lnation would be required that the sou1's disposition for self'-
awareness in nc way contributes to knowledge of the separated substances. St. 
Thomas 8wids these further diseuss:i.ons and returns to his purSUit of the 
topic of human destiny from which he turned aside six chapters earlier. 
We will turn now to the article in the SumtI18; Theolosiae7 in which' st. 
Thomas answers a question very similar to ths.t treated in the E! .... V..-eri;;.;;;.ta;.;· .. tel ... 
article8 in whieh we tound the central text at this thesis. 
The context of the article is the explanation ot how the h1.D:t18.n mind 
eames to know ditterent kinds of being. The three prev::1.ous questions are on 
our knowledge of material realities; the subsequent question is on our 
knowledge ot the separated substances. This article is the first in the 
question on our knowledge of the :interior spiritual realities of the ht2man 
person. 
The article itself has three main points: first, an explanaM.on ot the 
principle which governs the solution; secondly, the solution of the problem 
7S•T., I, 87, 1. ItThe title: utrum anima intellective. seipsam eognoscat 
per suint essentlam." 
SIn R! Veritate, 10, e, the title wass "Utrum mens seipsam per essentiam 
cognoscat, vei per aliquam speciem." 
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posed in the title; and thirdly, an explanation of the two ways ot knowing the 
human soul. 
First, st. Thomas gives a very tul1 explanation of the principle, 
nUnmnquodque cognoscibile est seeundum quod est actu.,,9 This is first shown 
be clear from consjderation of sight and understanding in general. St. Thomas 
moves ahead to the a.pplied principle t"ha.t to the degree a being is put in act 
by it. essenee, to the same degree w:t1l it be knowable by its easenee. 'lhe 
next point is to apply this developed principle to God, an angel, am to the 
human soul.10 Both God and the angel have immediate knowledge of themselws 
since by their essences they are :tn act in the intelligible order. The h'Ul'lWl 
possible intellect however is purely potential in the intelligible order. 
Thus the possible intellect will not come to know i tsel1' or the soul I 8 essence 
until it goes into act. 
The second part of the article is a brief diSCUssion of the mode of actus. 
knowing in the human mind. It is carried out by' setting up the Platonic 
explanation of knowledge through grasp of separated intelligible torms in 
contrast with st. Thomas' explanation through abstract.ion by the light of 
agent intel.lect. Since it is' by a.bstractive knowledge that the possible 
intellect goes into act in the intelligible order, 80 also in this manner 
does the mind come to know itself. 
91_1., I, 87, 1 c. 
IGrhis is the same method employed by st. Thomas in De Veritate, 8, 6. 
Cl. abow, p. hO. -
6'; 
In the t.hird section of th1a ar\icle. St. Thoma. proceeda to ducribe 
the -tit., lIIl18 in Whlch this knowledge of the aoul take. pla.ce. lnoVledge of 
ont t" singular existence (j! ~1c1ll.ari.)1a cont..ruted wi.tb knoWledge of the 
nature of the soul <!2 un1ve~). !he aecond, or scientific, mamer of 
lmow1ng the 80ul 18 ult1mate~ justified 'by the tact that the agent intel.leot 
1. a participation in the d1v1m light of .tt~mal truth.U In f'urther 
explaining the di1'.ference bet1Men tbe. tM:J waye of lmcndng ~. ThOlUJl po:lnt8 
totbe fact "deb waa mc:ph:1ned in the De Ventate passage whicb 1a the 
........ U ll, n 
pr1nc1pal topic ot thia tneca. 
Eat autem different1a int.er hu duu cognitionea. ~:Ul ad prlJaam 
CO¢t10Nml de mente habendam. auttielt Ipsa mentis praesent1a, quae 
eat princ1pium aotus, ex quo Mna percd.pit 84Itlpaaa. et ideo dioit-v 
.. cogno .. re per auan praeaentia. Sed ad 8fMrund.am cogni'tiOJB1 
de MDt. habendam non su.tfici "ejWl pra8eentia, _4 requiri tur 
dS11gena at aubt1l18 1nqu18itio. Onde et multi naturs.m lUrlmae 
ignorant, .t rrrulti .t1M c1rea nat'Unll ,mimae erra:verunt.12 
'lhu8 the lOuree (enola-) of the operatlon 1. describE!d as being 
pre_nt to the aind aDd tor this reuon gJ'Ounding the .lf~nes. had lid. t.h 
the soul's operations. !hue .. he.'Ia an ~ate awarenes. contrasted. Vi ttl 
knowledge gld.ned by' cllreful. :intellectual labor. And the reason for the 
llttJud1cium et effioacia huius eognitJ.oniII. per quam naturam Mjmae 
eognoacdmuB, competjJ. nobis ~ derlvationis ltaini8 intellectue noetrt a 
Writate dirt., in qua l;"8tionel omnium 1'el"'UDl eont1nen.tur." 8.1.. I, 87, 1 c. 
fbe thought of this pa ... ia exaet..ly parallel with that ot \\ie tovth part. 
of the corpus in B!. Venltate, 10, 8. 
12~.~., I, 67, 1 c. 
:immediacy of the former is sblpJ.y stated as the presenee of the source of 
hllmall operations. Our judgment is that this state of presence is exactlJ' 
what st. Thomas discussed in our De Veritate passage on habitual sel..f'-
-
knovledge. It is the same d1Bposi tion of the soul, but here not given the 
ample description through comparison with habitual knowledge through retained 
speci ... 
We will make tlft) observations on this treatment of the soult. knowledge 
of 1 tselt in the Summa Theologiat;. 
First, let us point out the reasons why St. Thomas did not make explicit 
mention of the soul's habitual knowledge of itself. One might bring forth as 
a reason the need for brevity and clarity in a manual of doctrine such as the 
Summa 1'heolods!. This reason does have some weight when one compares the 
corpus of this article with other articles and finds that in s1ze it is 
d.etin1te17 beyond the average. 
A more cogent reason would lie in the difference of intellectual 
atmosphere surrounding the writing of the De Veritate and the Summa 
-
Theolopu. In the earlier work, especially in the tenth question, the 
author! ty at hand is st. Augustine. From the concluding stmImB.1')" of the 
eighth article .. see that two of the four explanations are consonant with the 
doctrine and words of st. Augustine .13 When we move to the S\.U.!Wa, the 
l3n. Ver., 10, 8 (ad fin. corp.). It would be reasonable to argue that 
--the treatment of habitual selt-knowledge in the De Veritate is abled indirectly 
at establishing a sense in 1I1hich the words of Augu.'iine, "Mens aeips8m per 
seipaSJD. nov1t, If are true. A closeq related purpose is to leave intact the 
Augustinian explanation of the soul as an image of the Trinity. Thie i8 
clea:r~ the purpose when st. Thomas mentions habitual selt-knowledge in the 
Summa Theolofjae: ItSic_patet quod ~ semper intelUgit et amat ., non 
ac'ttDtlITJjr. 4i habitual1ter.1t :t Y51 ad k. 
6, 
unchallenged authority is Aristotle. In the article we have been study:Lng, it 
is an Aristotelian principle Which governs the extended discussion in the 
first part of the corpus. Correlatively with the dominance of Aristotle, we 
find the express rejection of a Pl.a:tonic position. 
Now if habitual seU ... }mowledge had been introduced, st. Thanas wou1.d haw 
had to do more than simply insert a distinction in the f'1nal part to show that 
self-awareness is had in two ways" actu and habitue He would need a diatinc-
-
tion right in the middle ot the el.aboration ot the Aristotelian governing 
principle. For then the human mind wouJ.d not appear 'in all respects a purel¥ 
potential knower, but regarding i tselt the mind would be in the modified 
disposition described in the !2!. .... Ve;;;ri;.;;;;.;,,;ta;;,.;te .. as the soul's habitual knowledge of 
itself' through its essence. It is easy to see this sense of a need for 
brevity and clarity as an adequate ground tor omitting treatment of' habitual. 
seU-knowledge in this article of the SUmma. 
A second observation on the article concerns methodology. \~e find a 
confirmation of our own choice of approach in th:t s thesis in the manner in 
wMch St. Thomas proceeds to explain his answer :tn this article. First, he 
elaborates a general. principle to guide his sE-arch tor the answer. vlith the 
parity between actuality trom essence and self-knowledge from essence 
established, it is a simple matter to find how the soul knows itself by show-
ing bow the po •• ible intellect is actuated. Speaking gererally, our procedure 
was to £1nd the el.ements of an explanation in the Commen1;!£Y .2! !!:! Sentences, 
then the guiding principles in the earlier sections of the .!!!. .... Ve_ri-...,.ta...,te...." and 
then to apply these prinCiples to show exac~ what was to be understood by 
the habitual knowledge the soul has of itself. The present article shows us 
that such is an authentically Thomistic methodology_ 
We will turn now to consider st. Thomas' commentary on Proposit.1.on XV of 
the Libel' .2! caUSi8.14 OUr consideration will proceed in three stepst first" 
a brief cons:i.deration of the oircumstances and intention of st. Thomas. 
Oommenta:z ~ !.!!. Libel' .:!!. Caus1sJ secondly, an examination of his text on 
Proposition XV; and thirdly, our observations on the contribution of the 
passage to the understanding of the B! Veritate passage on habitual self-
knowledge. 
The facts surrounding the writing of the Comm.enta;rz can be set forth in 
brief. In }lay, 1268, lrlilliam of Moerbeck presented st. '!barons with a Latin 
translation ot mclus' Elements E! ~eoloSl .. 1S' a deductive and axiomatic 
exposition of the world-picture of Nee-Platonism. 
Immediately, St. Thomas saw t.hat the Libel' ..2! _Ca_u .... s .... i ... s was nothing more 
than a digest of the doctrine of Proclu8, made up of excerpts from the 
Elements 2! TheoloQ:~ Thus, a £u11 o:,:planat:i.on of the tiber ~ Cauis could 
l40ur references will be ,to the paragraph m.mlbers in the new Marietti 
edition. .!!2 Librum .2! Caus:ts E?q2?sitio" ad. Ceslaus Pera, o.P. (Turin, 19,,). 
lSPeter Cnramello" "Pertinenta ad Librum fde causis,lO Ibid., p. xx. 
J.6.rhus st. Thomasa "In arabico vero invenitur hic libel' qui apud latinoa 
'de GaUSis' dicitur quem constat de arabico esse tr&nalatum et in graeco 
pen1tus non !laberi. Unde videtur ab aliquo Philosophormu arabum ex praedicto 
libro Procli exoerptus, pra.esertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro contimmtur. 
multo plerdue e1# di1'tu.si'U's oontinentur in 1110. Ibid., Prooemi:um, n. 9. 
-
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be made by fitting its var:ious propositions into their original context in the 
thought of Proclus. This is the work of st. Thanas' Comment:a!"Y.17 For 
example, in the seotion of the commentary l~ are about to take up, siX 
different pr:-opositions are taken from Proclus' E,lelIents to aid our urd.erstand-
ing of the 'WOrds of the Liber de CauBis.lt3 
.;;;;.;;0.;;;",;;;0;;._"';;;;;;';;;;';;;;;;; ... 
The actual text of st. Thomas can be broken dow into three parts, first, 
the insertion of the six Proclean propositions to expand the Liber ~ Causis 
text (nn • .302-307); secondly, st. Thomas' analysis of the three parts of the 
text ot the Liber de Gausis (nn. 308-311) J and ttdrdly', the c<.:IUI1ems of st. 
, -
Thomas on the doctrine found in trJ.s passage (nn. 312-313). 
The first aspeot of this conmlentDry pertinent to our thesis is the idea, 
presented in both the first and second parts of st. Thomas' text, that sinoe 
the soul returns upon itself in the opera.tion of eelf-knowledge, it must also 
return upon itself in its own BUbstance.19 This substantial return is shown 
17The work also fits into the controversial ourrent of the t:iJne", Thus: 
"Genu1num sensum et valorem libri de Gauais patefaciens, (st. Tbcnas) hunc 
librum. a sectatoribus Averroismi etA'iIcennismi, ,tanquam ab iniusti. 
po saessoribus, J in usum IlJUUDl 'Vindicat' et siC tutiUB defendere potest tlJll 
mult1plioationem intellectus in singulls hominibus (oontra Averroistas) tum 
unitatem formae aubsta'I'J.tialis in unoquoque (contra Avi cennizantes), 1deoque 
veram at sanam dootrinam de horninis natura servare." Caralnello, p. xx.v1. 
1651;. Thomas, In Librum de Causis, lect. 15, nne 302-307. 
.... ....... , 
19These doctrinal points are given twice. The substantial return is 
given, first, as found 5.n Proolus, Ibid., rul. 305-3<:6, and seoondly, as in the 
Libel' de Causis, Ibid., n. 310 (ad 1iil.). lie saw this idea expl.ained by St. 
Thom."'si'n the lA! 'Veri'tate section on divine sel.f-know1edge. Cf. above, pp. 
3~-.35. -
66 
20 
to be equ:1:valent to the soul's subsistence or independence ot matter. This, 
in turn, points to the human soul' a spiri tuali ty, or separability tram 
21 
matter. Thus tar the f'ormal exposition of' the doctrine of Proelua and the 
The most pertinent aspect ot the Co1mnent!!2 for our thesis is the third 
part where st. Thomas gives his observations on the text. It is here that _ 
must determine whether the Cownenta:z ~ !!!! Moor .9! Causla contains any 
manitestation ot St. Thomas' thought on the ground ot self'-awareness.22 
Our conclusion is that the entire passage ot the commentary on 
PropoSition XV i8 the transmission and comparison ot the thought of others, 
not the personal. doctrim of' st. Thomas. The evidence grounding the conclusion 
is found in the last two paragraphs of the passage (nn. 312-31.3). First, St. 
Thomas refers to another proposition of Proclus as proof of' the initial state-
ment ot t.he L1ber !!. _Ca ... U8 ....... 1s ... that the soul does know itself. This proof is in 
the tact that the soul. is a participant in the same nature as the superiOr 
intellectual bei.ngs which know themselves. Seeon<D.y, he refers to an earlier 
section of the Liber de C&U81a. to show that the First Intellect does know I ____ _ 
itself. '1'h1rdly, he refers to the R!. -.D1 .. ri __ n;;;;i,;;;,s Naninibus of Pseudo-Denis, to 
2~ Libr1D ;!! causis, nne .304, 3lJ.. 
~d., nne 303-.307, lll. 
22As noted above (p. 9) Fr. Georges Ducoin pointed to this passage as 
being of capital importance as he presented st. Thomas I doctrine on self-
knowledge. Sapient1a Aquinati~, pp. 247-2Sl. 
show more precisely the jrn.port for selt-knowledge of participation from 
separated intellectual beings. Fourthly, st. Thome.a adds that the human soul 
partiCipates in an inferior manner in this intellectual nature and 80 does not 
have illlmediate grasp of itself. Fifthly, st. 'fbomas repeats what we saw in 
the Summa 1heolO~1ae23 on the contrasting ways proposed by Plato and Aristotle 
on the ~ the human soul comes to know itself'. Thus it appears that St. 
Thomas1 Comment.!2: ~ ~ Liber .2! Causie, in treating Proposition X'f', is an 
historical study in philosophic thought on the implict't10ns of human 
reflective knowledge. As such it mal{es no sign..ificant addition to our under-
standing ot St. Thomas' mind as expressed :tn the De Veritate section on the 
-
soul f s bahi tual knowledge of' itself. 
With our study of the Commen~ ~ ~ tiber ~ Qausis we are given an 
ample review ot the Neo-Platonic picture of' the soul as substantial~ bent 
back on itself. st. Thomas does explain to us that this return is ultimate4*" 
a result ot the soul t s participation in the perfectly sel.f .. knowi1'lg First 
Intellect. Thus Neo-.Platonism would point to the M.story of this disposition 
of the soul, present to its knowing pol>rer, which underlies the selt-mmreneae 
a man baa in hie operations. OUr ~ .... Vc.-r .... i .... ta;...te ... text pointe to the exact nnture 
of this disposition. 
2, S.T., I, 87, 1 c. ct. above, p. 62. 
--
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